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There is limited understanding of how information diffuses across physician networks and what
motivates physicians to change behavior. In particular, despite growing interest in reducing overutilization
of care, physician “disadoption” of low-value technologies and services has received little empirical
attention. The structure of the organization in which a physician practices may be a key determinant of
physician behavior and, given current policy trends towards new organizational arrangements for
physicians, it is increasingly important to understand the dynamics of physician relationships in different
settings. This dissertation aims to advance empirical research on the role of physician organization in
physicians’ decisions to disadopt previously routine services following the release of new clinical
guidelines.
I examine the effects of two components of group organization, peer effects and group size, on physician
disadoption of low-value services in two settings: prostate cancer screening using the prostate-specific
antigen (PSA) test following the 2012 guideline recommending against screening, and mammography for
women under 50 following a change in the routine screening recommendation in 2009. Using claims data
from 2007-2013 from a major insurer in the Southeast Pennsylvania region, I employ dynamic panel data
methods and find that physicians are significantly and positively affected by peers who practice in the
same physical location while the behavior of peers with whom they have a relationship (through shared
patients) but are not co-located does not have a significant impact. Further, local peer effects appear to
peak in medium-sized physician groups of 11-30 physicians. Finally, in the case of PSA provision, positive
peer effects in medium-sized groups are stronger following the 2012 recommendation relative to before
the release, suggesting that physicians will be more likely to continue testing if their local peers continue
testing, even following the recommendation against screening. I do not find any differential effects of
peers on mammography screening after relative to before the guideline.
Together, these findings offer insight into how physicians make decisions about what services to provide
and suggest that the organizational structure of physician group practices is likely to be a contributing
factor to physician disadoption decisions and, ultimately, health care quality and costs.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Health Care Management & Economics

First Advisor
Robert Town

Subject Categories
Health and Medical Administration

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1998

THE EFFECTS OF PHYSICIAN ORGANIZATION ON THE DISADOPTION OF
LOW-VALUE SERVICES: EVIDENCE FROM PSA TESTING AND MAMMOGRAPHY
Aditi P. Sen
A DISSERTATION
in
Health Care Management and Economics
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2015

Supervisor of Dissertation

Robert Town, Professor, Health Care Management
Graduate Group Chairperson

Eric Bradlow, Professor of Marketing, Statistics, and Education

Dissertation Committee
Robert Town, Professor of Health Care Management
Kevin Volpp, Professor of Medicine and Health Care Management
Lawton R. Burns, James Joo-Jin Kim Professor of Health Care Management
Guy David, Associate Professor of Health Care Management

THE EFFECTS OF PHYSICIAN ORGANIZATION ON THE DISADOPTION OF
LOW-VALUE SERVICES: EVIDENCE FROM PSA TESTING AND MAMMOGRAPHY
c COPYRIGHT
2015
Aditi Priyadarshini Sen

This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons Attribution
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
License
To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I thank the many people at Wharton and Penn who generously gave me their time and
guidance. First and foremost, I thank my committee members, Robert Town, Kevin Volpp,
Rob Burns, and Guy David. I am incredibly grateful for their insights and suggestions,
and for their guidance and support, from helping me obtain the data that I needed to
complete the dissertation to navigating the job market. I have benefitted greatly from
Bob’s perspective and guidance over the past two years and I could not have completed this
work without it. I am very grateful for his support and reassurance through the job market
and dissertation phases of grad school. I have been lucky to have Kevin as an adviser and
mentor for the last six years. My research and graduate school experience overall have been
defined even beyond my expectations by his support, example, feedback, and collaboration.
Working with Rob over the past five years has shaped my research and his ongoing passion
for health care delivery has been inspirational - I always walk out of his office re-energized
and excited to get back to research. I am very appreciative of his support and enthusiasm.
I thank Guy for his advice on everything from getting data to conducting rigorous research
to negotiating agreements and for his enthusiasm for me and my work. I am also grateful
for the advice and attention from Jon Kolstad, Jalpa Doshi, Jingsan Zhu, Raghu Iyengar,
Joelle Friedman, and Joanne Levy, who ensures that we are the best cared for PhD students
I know. Also, many thanks to Aaron Smith-McLallen, Samantha Cruz, and Ravi Chawla
for funding and data and programming support, as well as helpful comments and discussion.
In addition to being intellectually stimulating and career-defining, graduate school has been
fun, due largely to my co-PhD students at Wharton. In particular, I am grateful for their
friendship and thoughtful comments and discussion to Anita Mukherjee, Victoria Perez,
Andrew Mulcahy, Sunita Desai, Ari Friedman, Adam Bloomfield, Henry Bergquist, Hessam
Bavafa, Jonathan Berman, and Jessica Pickett. Beyond Penn, I am lucky to have a group
of friends who have offered just the right mix of moral support and distraction to help me
get through the ups and downs of grad school. Thanks especially to my college “suities,”

iii

Ali Oliva, Katie Galipeau, Lynn Paul, Shelly Lin, Emily Schenker, and Purva Amar, as
well as Becca Brigham, Lauren Mandel, Sharon Boyd, Ben Somberg, Christine Moundas,
and Debbie & Dan Landry. One of the many benefits of getting married is that I have also
gained wonderful friends over the past four years. I am especially grateful to Sam Rosenfeld
& Erica de Bruin and Joanna Dee Das & Koushik Das.
I would probably not have entered the PhD program if not for the experiences I had and
mentors I met working in Washington, D.C. after college. At the U.S. Agency for International Development, Hope Sukin, Mary Harvey, Subhi Mehdi, John Paul Clark, Ishrat
Husein, and Irene Koek demonstrated daily how perseverance, partnership, and passion
can result in smart policymaking; theirs continue to be the voices in my head urging me
to think about how my research can answer questions that will ultimately improve health
and health care. After USAID, I spent a year at the White House Council of Economic
Advisers working on the early stages of health care reform. Working with Christy Romer,
Jean Abraham, and Mark Duggan, in particular inspired me to pursue a PhD in Economics
and to strive for a career that marries excellence in academic research with public service.
Finally, I thank my family. My parents, Jyoti and Ranjan Sen, have gone well beyond
being supportive of everything I have done, including graduate school, never failing to get
excited about what I’m doing, encourage me, and provide help and celebration as needed.
They have demonstrated the value of contributing each incremental step in the pursuit
of knowledge and their passion for their work continues to be an inspiration. I met my
husband, Sudhir Muralidhar, at the start of my second year of graduate school, and he has
patiently born through the anxiety and stress of PhD life and countered it with travel, food,
music, and his company. I can’t thank him enough for making my life immeasurably more
fun and full. I am also grateful to my parents-in-law, Veena and Morley Muralidhar, who
welcomed me into their family and offered much-appreciated encouragement and support
over the last five years.

iv

ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF PHYSICIAN ORGANIZATION ON THE DISADOPTION OF
LOW-VALUE SERVICES: EVIDENCE FROM PSA TESTING AND MAMMOGRAPHY
Aditi P. Sen
Robert Town
There is limited understanding of how information diffuses across physician networks and
what motivates physicians to change behavior. In particular, despite growing interest in
reducing overutilization of care, physician “disadoption” of low-value technologies and services has received little empirical attention. The structure of the organization in which
a physician practices may be a key determinant of physician behavior and, given current
policy trends towards new organizational arrangements for physicians, it is increasingly important to understand the dynamics of physician relationships in different settings. This
dissertation aims to advance empirical research on the role of physician organization in
physicians’ decisions to disadopt previously routine services following the release of new
clinical guidelines.
I examine the effects of two components of group organization, peer effects and group size,
on physician disadoption of low-value services in two settings: prostate cancer screening
using the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test following the 2012 guideline recommending
against screening, and mammography for women under 50 following a change in the routine
screening recommendation in 2009. Using claims data from 2007-2013 from a major insurer
in the Southeast Pennsylvania region, I employ dynamic panel data methods and find that
physicians are significantly and positively affected by peers who practice in the same physical
location while the behavior of peers with whom they have a relationship (through shared
patients) but are not co-located does not have a significant impact. Further, local peer effects
appear to peak in medium-sized physician groups of 11-30 physicians. Finally, in the case of
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PSA provision, positive peer effects in medium-sized groups are stronger following the 2012
recommendation relative to before the release, suggesting that physicians will be more likely
to continue testing if their local peers continue testing, even following the recommendation
against screening. I do not find any differential effects of peers on mammography screening
after relative to before the guideline.
Together, these findings offer insight into how physicians make decisions about what services
to provide and suggest that the organizational structure of physician group practices is likely
to be a contributing factor to physician disadoption decisions and, ultimately, health care
quality and costs.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
The diffusion of medical technologies and innovations through provider networks and organizations is a key contributor to health care costs and quality of care. While researchers
and policymakers have typically focused on the adoption of technology and innovation, “disadoption” of behaviors and services that are of little or no value to patients is also critical
in efforts to improve quality of care and reduce costs. Indeed, policymakers are increasingly
looking to evidence-based clinical guidelines issued by professional societies and other institutions such as the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) as vehicles for spreading
knowledge regarding recommended and non-recommended health procedures, tests, and
other services. In these efforts, it is typically assumed that physicians will change practices
to align with clinical evidence. Even after evidence of low value of a technology or procedure
is presented, however, provision of these services often persists, imposing costs on patients
and payers.
Efforts to use comparative effectiveness research and evidence-based guidelines to inform
clinical practices are increasing. For example, the Affordable Care Act of 2010 authorized
the establishment of the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to fund comparative clinical effectiveness research with the ultimate goal of improving “the quality and
relevance of evidence available to help patients, caregivers, clinicians, employers, insurers,
and policymakers make informed health decisions.”1 Another example is the “Choosing
Wisely” campaign, which calls on medical professional societies to address overutilization
by identifying frequently ordered tests and treatments that clinical evidence suggests are of
low or no value. Identification of these services is intended to lead to a reduction in use and,
in turn, “have beneficial effects on patient health by improving treatment and/or reducing
risks, and, where possible, reduc[ing] costs of care” (Good Stewardship Working Group,
2011). For these efforts to have the desired outcome of improving quality of care, physicians
have to abandon low-value services and, where appropriate, switch to procedures, drugs,
1

http://www.pcori.org/about-us.
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and other services that are shown to be relatively more effective.
Physician disadoption of a given drug or procedure is likely to be driven by a number
of factors, including his or her preferences, learning, reimbursement, practice setting, and
peer effects. A deeper understanding of what drives disadoption is a crucial first step in
improving the reach and impact of clinical guidelines and comparative effectiveness research.
This dissertation examines the role of physician organization and peer effects in physician
decisions to provide and disadopt low-value services following the release of new clinical
guidelines. I address this question specifically in the case of two low-value services for which
guidelines have been issued in the past few years recommending (with varying strength)
against provision. The first case is prostate cancer screening, following the release of the
2012 USPSTF recommendation against routine screening using the prostate-specific antigen
(PSA) test. The second case is breast cancer screening using mammography following the
release of the 2009 USPSTF recommendation that women between the ages of 40 and 49
weigh the pros and cons of regular testing with their physicians (rather than routine biennial
screening).
While adoption of new services, drugs, and technology has been widely studied, the impact
of new norms or information on physician disadoption of services has received much less
attention. Conceptually, disadoption in the presence of new information (e.g., of low clinical
value) can be thought of as the inverse of adoption given new information, however, there
are several reasons why these decisions are in fact likely to be asymmetric. First, a major
difference between the adoption decision and the disadoption decision is that at the time
of adoption, a physician has no personal experience with the technology or drug and thus
relies fully on external sources (e.g., information, peers) when deciding whether or not to
adopt. Thus, adoption will require investments in time to learn and potentially in resources
to implement the new technology. In contrast, at the time of disadoption, the physician
has personal experience that informs his or her decision and previous levels of usage and
outcomes are likely to play a key role in the decision (Burns and Wholey, 1993). Disadoption
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therefore typically does not require substantial time or resources, and there may be less
demand for external social and informational influences.
There are also psychological and behavioral factors that intensify the asymmetry between
disadoption of low-value services and adoption of high-value services, including confirmation bias (the tendency to interpret or prefer information that confirms existing beliefs or
hypotheses) and loss aversion (Roman and Asch, 2014; Ubel and Asch, 2015). Inertia and
status quo bias may combine with these factors to hinder changes in behavior that require
abandonment even more (Howard and Shen, 2011). Inertia may also slow adoption, but the
combination of a physician culture that promotes aggressive and thorough treatment, financial incentives to “do more” built into fee-for-service reimbursement, and concern about
malpractice leading to defensive medicine (Emanuel and Fuchs, 2008) is more likely to
counter inertia in adoption of new technologies, procedures, or drugs while further slowing
disadoption.
Patient demand for more care is also likely to stimulate adoption while impeding disadoption. For example, in the case of PSA testing, a survey of men without a history of prostate
cancer following the release of the USPSTF recommendation found that over half of respondents planned not to follow the recommendation and get a PSA test in the future
(Squiers et al., 2013). Indeed, the relatively small literature on physician disadoption or
abandonment of a technology or service that is outdated or determined to be of low value
generally finds modest declines in use following negative evidence, with many patients still
receiving the service after evidence is published (Duffy and Farley, 1992; Howard and Shen,
2011; Stafford et al., 2006). Results from this literature suggest that a number of factors
are likely to be relevant in these decisions, including physician, patient, and (for inpatient
services) hospital characteristics, as well as economic incentives and information (Duffy and
Farley, 1992).
In this dissertation, I test the effect of one likely factor in physician decision-making on
physician decisions to disadopt low-value services: physician organization and group struc-
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ture. In particular, I examine the effects of a physician’s peers on take-up of, and adherence
to, evidence-based guidelines, and explore how these effects vary with group size. From
a policy perspective, an improved understanding of what drives adherence to guidelines
has the potential to improve the reach and adoption of such recommendations in efforts
to improve quality and reduce costs of care. In addition, this work provides insights into
peer effects in two ways: first, by evaluating the effects of different types of peers who may
influence behaviors via different mechanisms, and second, by evaluating the relationship
between peer effects and a critical component of group organization: size. The role of group
size is especially important considering the growing trend in consolidation of medical groups
and the focus on large integrated groups and networks of physicians (e.g., accountable care
organizations).
Thusfar, it has been clearly demonstrated that peer effects exist in many settings, including
among physicians (Nair et al., 2010; Iyengar et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2014; Huesch, 2011),
however there is little empirical work on the mechanisms that drive these effects, how effects vary across different types of peers, or how peer effects interact with organizational
structures. I use detailed claims data from 2007-2013 from a major insurer in the Southeast
Pennsylvania region, covering over 20,000 physicians and the claims of over 700,000 individuals, to evaluate empirically the role of peers and group size in physicians’ decisions to
disadopt a low-value service following a national recommendation. I compare the effects of
two types of peers on individual physician low-value service use and disadoption: first, local
peers who practice in the same physical location (i.e., at the same address), and second,
peers who share patients. Physicians who share patients are likely to have a relationship
(e.g., through referrals) but unlikely to be practicing in the same office.
The goal of the empirical analysis is to assess the relationship between local and nonlocal peer usage of low-value services and an individual physician’s use. For local peers,
I measure average behavior in the group (excluding the physician’s own behavior), and
for peers who share patients, I calculate a weighted average of peer use where weights
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are based on the extent of patient-sharing between a given pair of physicians. I employ
dynamic panel data methods (the Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments estimator)
to account for serial correlation over time, control for physician preferences, and mitigate
several identification concerns in the estimation of peer effects, including endogenous group
formation and simultaneity of individual and peer behavior. This analysis leads to three
major conclusions.
First, I find that physicians are significantly and positively affected by peers who practice in
the same physical location while the behavior of peers with whom they have a relationship
(through shared patients) but are not co-located does not have a significant impact. This
result is consistent across both PSA and mammography provision. My results suggest that
if local peers increase low-value service usage by a given factor, individual physician usage
will increase by about half of that factor. Second, I find that local peer effects peak in
medium-sized physician groups (11-30 physicians). In the PSA analysis, peer effects are
near zero in smaller and larger groups while in the mammography analysis they are positive
but relatively smaller than in medium-sized groups.
Building on the finding that peer effects are strongest in medium-sized groups, I use a
difference-in-differences framework and find further that local peers in medium-sized groups
have a significant and positive effect on physician provision of PSA testing following the
release of the USPSTF recommendation in 2012 relative to before the release. While in
relatively smaller and bigger groups there is no differential effect of peers after the recommendation relative to before, positive peer effects appear to be stronger in medium-sized
groups following the recommendation. This finding suggests that physicians in mediumsized groups will be more likely to continue testing if their local peers continue testing,
even following the recommendation against screening. I do not find any differential effects
of peers on mammography screening after relative to before the guideline. This result is
not surprising given that there was no substantial decline in mammography following the
guideline change; my data show a post-recommendation decline of 70 percent in PSA testing
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compared to only a two percent drop in mammography.
A rich dataset of claims and provider data allow me to provide novel insights into three topics
that have received little empirical attention despite their growing relevance to health policy.
First, I study physician disadoption behaviors which have been understudied relative to
adoption behaviors despite the critical role that reducing low-value services plays in cutting
health care costs and improving quality of care. Second, I study the effects of two different
types of peers, and, third, I test the relationship between peer effects and physician group
size. This research lends insight into how changes in practice may diffuse across physician
networks and how physicians make disadoption decisions. These implications for policy
are especially important given the rising interest in reducing overutilization of care and
countering incentives to oversupply care that are embedded in the dominant fee-for-service
physician payment system. The findings on the interactions between peer effects and group
size also lend insight into the dynamics of physician interactions in different types of groups,
which has the potential to inform policymaking around delivery system reform.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the relevant literature for this
study. Chapter 3 presents an overview of my empirical strategy for estimating the effects of
peers and group size on physician provision and disadoption of low-value services, including
my empirical approach, how I measure peer effects, and identification challenges with peer
effects estimation and how I address these challenges. Chapter 4 applies this strategy to the
case of PSA screening following the new 2012 USPSTF guideline and Chapter 5 considers
the case of mammography following the new 2009 USPSTF guideline. Chapter 6 presents a
discussion of and conclusions based on the analyses, discusses the limitations of this work,
and offers thoughts on potential areas for future work.
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CHAPTER 2 : Literature Review
This section presents a review of the literature that is relevant to understanding how physicians make disadoption decisions (and more broadly, change) and the roles that group
organization, especially size and peer behavior, may play in that decision-making. Previous
research falls in four general categories. First, there is a broad literature from organizational theory on learning within organizations and the forces that affect knowledge transfer,
including the role of (physical) proximity among group members, which is relevant for
understanding the role of “local” peers in physician disadoption. I then summarize the
literature on physician organization and implications for physician behavior as well as the
costs and quality of care. The existing evidence on the implications of provider group size
from this literature is especially relevant to this dissertation. The third body of work is
on changing physician behaviors and, in particular, on promoting adherence to evidencebased guidelines. Included is the small but growing literature on peer and network effects
among physicians that has thusfar focused largely on the influence of peers on physician
adoption of prescription drugs. Finally, I discuss the literature on organizational and social
determinants of innovation adoption which is relevant for considering the factors that drive
physician adoption and disadoption.

2.1. Organizational Learning
There is a rich literature in organizational behavior on learning within organizations. This
literature on learning breaks down into three areas which align with mechanisms through
which learning occurs: knowledge creation, knowledge retention, and knowledge transfer
(Argote and Ophir, 2002; Argote, 2011). I focus here on the subset of literature on knowledge
transfer since this area is the most relevant for understanding what might drive learning
within and across organizations that would, in turn, lead to organizational change, such
as disadoption of practices among physicians within a group. Though this literature is
focused generally on knowledge transfer among units within an organization (rather than
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among individuals), it provides a useful context in which to consider how the individual
knowledge of a physician within a group becomes embedded into the organization and is
then transferred to coworkers, leading to organizational learning and potentially change.
There are many factors which influence knowledge transfer, including the environmental
and organizational context, the type of knowledge being transferred, and social networks
and relationships. I discuss each of these factors below.
2.1.1. Environmental and Organizational Context
Learning within an organization is impacted by environmental factors beyond the boundaries of the organization (e.g., competitors, clients, regulators) as well as by the organizational context (including structure, culture, identity, strategy, and incentives) (Argote and
Miron-Spektor, 2011). Learning is facilitated, for example, by an organization in which
members share a “superordinate identity,” feel psychologically safe, and trust each other
(Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011; Kane et al., 2005; Edmondson, 1999; Levin and Cross,
2004). Other work suggests that knowledge is more easily transferred between units within
an organization if the units are similar rather than dissimilar (Argote and Ingram, 2000;
Baum and Berta, 1999; Darr and Kurtzberg, 2000). This might mean, for instance, that
knowledge will spread more easily in a single-specialty physician group than in a multispecialty group. These findings suggest that the transfer of knowledge acquired by one unit
(or individual) within a firm will vary depending on the organizational and environmental
context and thus that any interventions to promote learning or behavior change through
learning will likely need to be tailored to the specific context in order to be effective.
2.1.2. Type of Knowledge
The type of knowledge or task being shared also affects transfer. Knowledge can vary along
many dimensions, including its “causal ambiguity” (ease of understanding and the strength
of the link between the knowledge or task and outcome) and, relatedly, its “demonstrability”
(ease of showing its appropriateness) (Szulanski, 1996; Kane, 2010). Tasks or pieces of
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knowledge that are “causal ambiguous” are difficult to transfer while those that are well
understood and easily observable are relatively more easily transferred (Szulanski, 1996;
Meyer and Goes, 1988). For example, in a study of the transfer of best practices, Szulanski
(1996) find evidence of internal “stickiness” where knowledge transfer was hindered by causal
ambiguity, as well as recipients’ lack of absorptive capacity and tensions between the source
and recipient. Knowledge can also be “codified” or not. “Codified” knowledge is embedded
into routine and therefore more easily transferred than non-codified knowledge (Argote and
Ophir, 2002; Zander and Kogut, 1995).
Further, different types of knowledge are transferred more effectively in different types of
organizational and social networks. Hansen (1999) finds that while the search for noncomplex knowledge happens across weak ties (involving infrequent and distant interaction),
when knowledge is non-codified or complex, strong ties (involving repeated interaction)
are necessary for effective transfer (including knowledge acquisition and understanding).
This area of work suggests that it is critical to understand the type of knowledge being
transferred in order to determine which networks are likely to have the most successful
transfer and where it is likely to be difficult to spread new information. (For example,
where physicians feel the new recommendation against PSA testing is causally ambiguous
and testing is embedded in existing routines, it will likely be more difficult for physicians
to transfer knowledge leading to PSA disadoption.)
2.1.3. Social Networks and Relationships
The organizational behavior literature emphasizes the importance of being collocated for
knowledge transfer. Latané (1981) develops a theory of social impact which rests on the
premise that people who are proximate have more impact and that free-riding within groups
is reduced with proximity since each member’s contribution is easily visible and can be
clearly identified. Individuals are likely to interact more frequently with and pay relatively
more attention to those who are in the same location, making these interactions more “memorable” and influential than those with individuals who are at a greater distance (Latané
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et al., 1995; Festinger, 1950). Further, proximity promotes conformity through its effect on
social pressure and “felt surveillance” (Kiesler and Cummings, 2002) and face-to-face discussion plays a key role in development and maintenance of group culture and tacit norms
(Levitt and March, 1988), from promoting group identity to increasing commitments to
social contracts (for a review, see Sally (1995)). This informal, spontaneous communication
that occurs in offices or other locations has a significant impact on how groups function,
including how knowledge is transferred within the group; where it is absent, the lack of
observation and conversation poses challenges for groups trying to collaborate, make joint
decisions, and engage in (voluntary) collaboration (Kiesler and Cummings, 2002). Thus,
this body of research illustrates that knowledge transfer is substantially greater when units
or groups engage in direct social contact (Baum and Berta, 1999), suggesting that local
(collocated peers) are important influences on individual behavior if knowledge is shared
and impacts behavior. I return to this in my discussion of the effects of local peers on
individual physician disadoption.
Beyond the importance of proximity, there is substantial evidence that social networks and
relationships among members influence knowledge transfer. Research shows that knowledge
transfers more fluidly across organizational units if the units are embedded within a shared
social relationship, such as having a “superordinate” relationship such as a franchise or chain
rather than being fully independent. For example, Darr et al. (1995) find that knowledge
transferred across fast food stores owned by the same franchise but not across stores owned
by different franchises. Stores owned by the same franchise are closer in geographic location
and have meetings, and are therefore likely to have shared personal relationships than among
stores who do not share a franchise. The authors argue that knowledge is transferable across
stores owned by the same franchise due largely to these personal acquaintances. Similarly,
Baum and Ingram (1998) find that hotels benefited from the experiences of other local hotels
in the same chain but not from nonlocal hotels. While the examples of fast food franchises
and hotel chains do not directly apply to the context of health care, these findings may
similarly suggest that knowledge is likely to be more readily transferred among physicians
10

and practices who are embedded in a shared network (e.g., through membership in an
academic medical center provider network) than among independent providers.

2.2. Physician Organization
The evidence on the implications of physician group size is mixed and relatively limited in
scope (i.e., geographically, or in terms of covering patients with a specific condition), and
therefore may not be generalizable across settings. Further, there is little empirical evidence on the impacts of group size on physician behavior (vs. group-level productivity and
efficiency). Theoretical considerations offer many potential benefits of scale in physician
groups, including improved leverage with insurers and other benefits of enhanced market
power, increased access to capital, and scale economies. In addition, larger group practices
have the potential to benefit from internalization of referrals, extended patient coverage,
profiting from ancillary services (e.g., imaging), improved lifestyle for physicians, and centralized administration (Casalino et al., 2003; Haas-Wilson and Gaynor, 1998; Pope and
Burge, 1996; Robinson and Casalino, 1995; Kralewski et al., 1999, 2000; Greenfield et al.,
1992; Ketcham et al., 2007; Weeks et al., 2010).
Increasing firm size can have direct effects in terms of the increase in the number of members
and relationships within the firm, as well as indirect effects if new members lead to product
differentiation (Blau, 1970). Countering the potential benefits of increased size, these effects
may result in problems of coordination and communication (for a review, see Kimberly
(1976)) which, in turn, may negatively affect patient care and increase cost in the medical
group setting. Further, a potential disadvantage of large group practices is that as the size
of the group increases, group culture can become less collegial and cohesive and there may
be less organizational trust and focus on quality (Curoe et al., 2003) as well as decreased
communication and participation, which can lead to increased competition and conflict
among group members (Wheelan, 2009). These adverse consequences may offset benefits of
larger group size.
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There is limited empirical evidence of any relationships between organizational size and
performance (Dalton et al., 1980). Generally, the literature on physician group size suggests
that though group practices are likely to be more efficient than solo practitioners in terms
of visits or revenue generated, scale economies in physician groups are limited. Indeed, the
evidence is generally suggestive of small or nonexistent scale economies in physician group
settings and where there is evidence of scale economies, they tend to peak in relatively small
groups of physicians and then drop as group size increases (for a review of the evidence on
horizontal integration of physicians, see Burns et al. (2013)).
There is limited rigorous empirical work on what the “optimal” group size is in terms of
scale economies, but existing estimates suggest that it is likely to be around seven to ten
physicians. Ketcham (2001) finds evidence of economies of scale in group practices (i.e.,
falling operating costs/relative value unit (RVU) as group size increases). His evidence
shows, however, that this effect plateaus once group size reaches four to sixteen physicians,
after which costs begin to increase. Weil (2002) finds that a practice size of ten provided the
maximum economies of scale based on RVUs and that multispecialty practices with more
than 50 physicians actually exhibit diseconomies of scale, potentially due to care delivery
at multiple sites, a higher percentage of managed care patients, and less effective control of
time and resources. Rosenman and Friesner (2004) also find evidence that suggests potential
scale inefficiencies in large group practices. Other work suggests that a practice size of five to
ten may be optimal in terms of taking advantage of economies of scale and decision-making
without having to delegate to semi-corporate structure such as a board (Hough, 2002). In
contrast, other studies find no evidence of a relationship between group size and practice
costs and returns to scale (Escarce and Pauly, 1998).
Recent work has also highlighted that the relationship between group size and productivity
is likely to vary with group characteristics, including specialty (Hough et al., 2013) and
composition of providers within the group (McWilliams et al., 2013). Hough et al. (2013)
estimate physician practice production functions for four different specialties and find dis-
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tinctions across specialties in production function and implications for optimal group size.
Similarly, recent work has suggested that the composition of medium and large groups (in
particular, the percentage of PCPs) is an important factor in how these groups compare to
small groups; McWilliams et al. (2013) find that medium-sized and large independent physician groups with a low (less than 35 percent) fraction of PCPs had higher per-beneficiary
costs than small groups while groups with a high PCP fraction actually had lower costs.
Medium-sized groups with a low PCP fraction also had higher readmission rates than small
groups, an effect that disappeared among medium-sized groups with a high fraction of
PCPs. Both medium and large groups with a high PCP fraction had notably higher quality
of diabetes care than small groups.
In terms of physician behavior and practice patterns, a small body of evidence suggests
that physicians in large groups treat more intensively and provide more services than solo
practitioners. Epstein et al. (1983) review the records of 351 patients (of 21 physicians)
with uncomplicated hypertension and find that physicians in large groups (more than five
patients) ordered nearly twice as many tests as those in small or solo practices. After
controlling for several possible explanations, the authors suggest that this phenomenon may
be due to peer pressure within large groups or to physician (and/or patient) self-selection
into these groups. In a more recent study of care of heart attack patients, Ketcham et al.
(2007) find that patients treated by solo practitioners were the least likely to receive any
of the four treatments they measured and were least likely to survive. Treatment rates
increased and mortality rates decreased as group size increased from two to 19 providers and
then plateaued in bigger groups; one explanation that the authors suggest for this plateauing
effect is that there is a big difference in ease of information sharing and communication
between solo and other practices but not among larger groups. In terms of outcomes in
groups of different sizes, one study of size and quality demonstrated that smaller groups
had fewer preventable admissions than larger groups (Casalino et al., 2014).
Overall, the literature on physician group size and implications for physician behavior and
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cost and quality of care remains limited and mixed, but suggests that groups of smallmedium size may be most likely to exhibit economies of scale. Evidence also suggests
that peer norms and pressure may play a role in physician treatment decisions, but there
remains limited empirical evidence in this area. The literature highlights the need for further
empirical work to understand these relationships more precisely.

2.3. Changing Physician Behavior
Understanding what drives physician behavior and treatment decisions - and how these
behaviors might be altered - is important since physician practices drive health care costs
and quality. Indeed, Cutler et al. (2013) find that physician beliefs about treatment, and, to
a lesser degree, organizational factors (such as peer effects), are the most important factors
in explaining regional variation in Medicare spending. Specifically, their results suggest that
physician beliefs that are unsupported by clinical evidence explain 36 percent of end-of-life
spending and 17 percent of health care spending overall in the United States (Cutler et al.,
2013). Therefore, any changes in medical practice, including adherence to evidence-based
guidelines will necessarily depend on influencing physician decision-making and behavior.
The literature on physician acceptance of guidelines suggests that adherence is relatively
low and varies substantially (Timmermans and Mauck, 2005; Greco and Eisenberg, 1993;
Lomas et al., 1989). There are numerous barriers to physician adherence to evidence-based
guidelines, including lack of familiarity or awareness, lack of agreement with specific guidelines or guidelines in general (for instance, believing that guidelines challenge physician
autonomy), and lack of motivation or the presence of inertia hindering changes in behavior.
In addition, external factors such as patient demand, the presence of contradictory guidelines, and environmental factors including failing to align reimbursement with new guidance
and lack of resources to implement new guidelines can hinder take-up (Cabana et al., 1999;
Francke et al., 2008; Okonofua et al., 2006; Greco and Eisenberg, 1993; Grol, 2001). Other
work has shown that incentives and compensation arrangements as well as market pressure
can also play a role in adherence to evidence-based practices within physician organiza14

tions (Shortell et al., 2001), as can the characteristics of the guidelines themselves, such as
whether they require complex changes in clinical practices or changes in practices that are
well-established and routine (Grol, 2001; Grol and Grimshaw, 2003). Previous work suggests that there are a number of approaches to influencing physician adherence to clinical
guidelines, which have been employed with varying success. There is consensus that passive
distribution of information (e.g., publishing guidelines) and traditional didactic continuing
medical education is generally ineffective at changing behavior and that a multi-faceted
approach that combines interventions such as interactive education with feedback are more
likely to be effective (Bauchner et al., 2001; Grimshaw et al., 2001; Gross et al., 2001).
Notably for this dissertation, previous evidence has found that “peer” or “social” influences
and norms are an important determinant of physician adherence to evidence-based guidelines (Conroy and Shannon, 1995; Mittman et al., 1992) and that social influence strategies
may be effective in increasing take-up of guidelines (Bauchner et al., 2001; Grol, 2001; Gross
et al., 2001). In one study of the implementation of evidence-based guidelines, over half of
physicians cite discussion of guidelines within their local group of physicians as a source of
information, along with scientific journals and course attendance and other contacts with
other colleagues (Grol, 2001). In another study, when asked why they change practices,
general practice physicians reported contact with hospital-based specialists as one of the
four main drivers of change (along with national or authority-driven factors, education, and
the specific case and demand of patients) (Allery et al., 1997). Other work has shown that
discussions with local “opinion leaders” may play an important role in promoting evidencebased practice (Flodgren et al., 2011). Further, this research has proposed that group size
should inform which social influence strategy is appropriate (e.g., one-on-one contact when
individuals or small groups are targeted vs. use of local “opinion leaders” in medium-sized
groups vs. “mass media” in very large groups), implying that peer dynamics and effects
may vary across groups of different sizes.
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2.3.1. Physician Peer Effects
The literature summarized in the previous section suggests that peers can be an important factor in physician decisions about whether or not to follow evidence-based guidelines.
Below I summarize the empirical literature relevant to understanding peer effects among
physicians. There is a sizable literature on networks and peer effects broadly, including
studies of peer effects in schooling, neighborhoods, and communication technologies (Sacerdote, 2001; Ioannides and Zabel, 2008; Ryan and Tucker, 2012; Tucker, 2008). In the area of
health, researchers have studied peer effects in medical school (Arcidiacono and Nicholson,
2005), health behaviors such as obesity (Christakis and Fowler, 2007) and risky behaviors
(Card and Giuliano, 2013), health plan choice (Sorensen, 2006), and, most relevant for this
paper, physician behavior. The literature on peer effects and physician behavior is still
relatively small. In landmark early work, Coleman et al. (1957) conducted surveys to map
out physician social networks and found that physicians with the most connections (named
by other doctors as an adviser or friend) were more likely to adopt a new drug, suggesting
that social networks, as well as an individual’s place in the network, matter for the diffusion
of innovation.
More recent work shows that social influences have implications for adoption of technology
(Escarce, 1996) and prescription drugs (Yang et al., 2014; Nair et al., 2010; Iyengar et al.,
2011). In a recent paper, Yang et al. (2014) use fixed effect and first difference models to
study the effect of peer use on physician prescribing of antipsychotic drugs for schizophrenia
patients. They find evidence of small peer effects overall, with stronger effects in groups
that have existed for longer, are relatively larger (ten or more physicians), or are relatively
more stable. They also find that peer effects are stronger when drugs are new to the market.
Similarly, Huesch (2011) finds evidence of inter-office peer effects on stent utilization among
cardiologists in Florida. Both these studies use a similar empirical approach, regressing
a focal physician’s use of the particular drug or stent on use among the physician’s peers
and including physician fixed effects to mitigate concerns about selection into groups and
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exogenous group characteristics which may confound peer effects. I discuss identification
concerns in Chapter 3.
There is also a relevant literature in marketing, which finds that physician behavior is significantly influenced by “opinion leaders,” to whom they look for expertise, creating “asymmetric” peer effects (e.g., between PCPs and specialists). In these settings, evidence suggests
that opinion leaders have significant influence over provider behavior such as adoption of
a new drug (Nair et al., 2010; Iyengar et al., 2011). Nair et al. (2010) leverage a natural
experiment, the release of new guidelines about a specific drug, when physicians’ prescribing
behaviors were more likely to be influenced by the behavior of specialists in their networks.
Using fixed effect regressions, the authors find that the opinion leader’s prescribing behavior has a positive and significant effect on physician prescribing, but only after the new
guidelines were introduced. They use an instrumental variables approach to mitigate identification concerns and find consistent results. Similarly, Iyengar et al. (2011) find evidence
of “social contagion” in adoption of a new prescription drug across networks. They capture
peer behavior using a lagged adoption indicator, usage in the previous quarter, as well as
prescription volume, and find that adoption is influenced by peers’ usage volume rather
than by a binary measure of adoption. Thus, they conclude that volume contagion exists
and find further that this effect is moderated by physicians’ self-reported leadership status.
In a follow-up study relevant to this paper, Iyengar et al. (2015) extend their analysis to
consider the effects of peers on repeat behavior as well as during adoption. They find that
while there is evidence of contagion in both the trial and repeat stages, the types of peers
who are influential and the type of physician who is most “influenceable” are different at
each stage. At trial, heavy users who are discussion and referral partners (and “trusted
experts,” identified by survey) drive contagion while “immediate colleagues” (those who
are co-located) drive contagion at the repeat phase. This phenomenon suggests to the
authors that peer effects at the trial stage are driven by risk and uncertainty in the product
(“informational influence,” exerted by experts) while conformity to co-located peer norms
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drives repeat behavior (“normative influence”). At the repeat stage, personal experience
after adoption lessens uncertainty and reduces demand for information from peers. Instead,
Iyengar et al. (2015) suggest that as the technology diffuses and becomes more legitimate,
providers seek to conform to norms within their local peer group. This work is consistent
with findings from Burns and Wholey (1993), that network effects affect adoption but not
abandonment; they attribute this effect to the fact that organizations have little experiential
knowledge about a given innovation at the time of adoption while they depend more on
own experience at the time of abandonment. Iyengar et al. (2015) build on a rich body of
literature in organizational behavior that considers social and normative forces that lead
organizations to change, including adopting new innovations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Burns and Wholey, 1993). I briefly touch on this literature below to highlight the broader
context in which we can think about why physicians are likely to follow the behavior of
their peers.

2.4. Organizational Change and Innovation Adoption
There is a rich literature on organizational change. I focus here on a select group of papers
that provide useful context for this dissertation’s study of the implications of organization,
including peers and group size, for physician disadoption. Because there is limited study of
abandonment of innovations as a form of organizational change, these papers focus on why
organizations adopt new innovations and why they change in ways that conform to peer or
leader organizations in their environment.
The organizational behavior literature has suggested that there are both “technical” and
“non-technical” reasons why an organization may adopt a new innovation (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Kimberly, 1978; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott,
1990). Technical reasons include the need to address organization-specific problems (e.g.,
growing size and diversity may necessitate the adoption of a new innovation in administration/management). Non-technical reasons arise due to the organization’s position in
interorganizational networks or social relationships (Coleman et al., 1966; Galaskiewicz,
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1985). These forces may come from a variety of sources, including normative pressure to
adopt from dominant organizations (Becker, 1970; Burt, 1980), the fact that organizations
who are proximate in the social network adopt (Galaskiewicz, 1985), or “homophily,” a set
of common values and norms among members of a network or group, which enhances the
diffusion of new information and may promote adoption of innovation (Rogers, 1983). These
non-technical forces driving adoption cause organizations in the same network or field to
converge towards similar structures and capacities.
In their seminal institutional theory paper, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) address this phenomenon that organizations in a given field tend to look similar (“isomorphism”). The
authors identify three mechanisms of isomorphic change: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive change occurs due to political influence and organizations striving to gain
legitimacy from other organizations. This type of change is driven by formal and informal
pressures exerted by more dominant organizations in the field or simply due to the shared
legal environment or government regulation. Essentially, dominant organizations set rules
and legitimate practices and other organizations conform. Mimetic change is isomorphism
resulting from a “standard response to uncertainty,” where an organization simply imitates
organizational models who serve as a convenient source of practices. For example, in their
study of hospital innovation, Burns and Wholey (1993) characterize mimetic forces as a
“fad sweeping through the hospital industry,” where hospitals adopt the new management
approach because they are unsure of what to do and so they copy their peers.
Normative change is due largely to professionalization. Individuals within a profession are
trained in organizations with certain norms and professional and trade associations develop
and promulgate normative rules about how professionals and organizations ought to behave.
Normative forces may also be driven by local and regional networks and pressures exerted
by dominant organizations. When these dominant organizations adopt the new innovation
it becomes seen as legitimate and increases pressure to adopt among other organizations
who adopt to conform to norms within their institutional context (Coleman et al., 1966;
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Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Given these mechanisms, DiMaggio
and Powell (1983) hypothesize that isomorphic change is likely to happen more quickly if
technologies are more uncertain, there is more professionalization in the field, and the field
is more structured so that leaders in the field are easily identified.
Many studies have considered mimetic versus normative cues to adopt innovation in a range
of settings, including public schools (Rowan, 1982), municipal reform (Knoke, 1982), and
hospitals (Luft et al., 1986; Burns and Wholey, 1993). Burns and Wholey (1993) build on
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) with a study of organizational and social factors in innovation
adoption in hospitals, finding evidence that non-technical factors are largely driving adoption of a new management innovation in hospitals. Diffusion occurred quickly, the regional
level of adoption exerted a significant effect on the probability of adoption, and patterns of
adoption demonstrated that more prestigious organizations adopted first, followed by the
less prestigious. These findings suggest to the authors that there was significant normative cue-taking rather than strategic responses to competitors. While normative, mimetic,
and coercive mechanisms are difficult to separate empirically, understanding these potential
forces has important insights for considering what mechanisms might be driving peer effects
in the cases studied in this dissertation.
Before concluding it is important to return to the “technical” reasons for adoption and abandonment, which may include organizational size, an area of interest in this dissertation. In
addition to studying the mimetic and normative network-based factors influencing adoption,
Burns and Wholey (1993) also consider organizational factors, including size and diversity,
that might drive adoption (e.g., because the new approach could solve specific managerial
problems associated with increasing complexity). In this setting, increasing organizational
size has direct effects (an increase in the number of relationships) and indirect effects (increasing differentiation), which require a more developed approach to coordination. Though
size is not an overall predictor of adoption, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that
organizational diversity and size are predictors of adoption among early adopters.
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This finding regarding early adopters is in line with Tolbert and Zucker (1983), who suggest
that organizational factors are important for early adoption while institutional factors (e.g.,
local and regional adoption) are important for later adoption. Burns and Wholey (1993) also
look at abandonment of the innovation and find weak evidence of increased abandonment
among smaller organizations. In another study, Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) find that
size is a better predictor of adoption of both technological and administrative innovations
than either individual factors (e.g., the tenure or educational background of leaders such as
the chief medical officer or hospital administrator) or contextual factors (e.g., competition,
city size, hospital age). These papers offer evidence that adoption (and disadoption) may
be influenced by organization size, as well as non-technical factors such as social networks.
2.4.1. Conclusions
A review of the relevant literature offers several take-aways which inform the analyses and
interpretation of findings in this dissertation. First, the organizational theory and economics
literatures suggest that the actions of peers, especially proximate peers, are likely to be key
factors in physician decisions regarding take-up of a new guideline. Local peers may exert
their influence through a number of mechanisms, including group norms, shared culture, and
ease of learning through face-to-face communication. The marketing literature has shown
that “opinion leaders” and referral partners can also be important in physician behavior
change.
Second, the organizational theory literature notes that the type of knowledge being transferred will affect the success of the transfer. This is important to consider in efforts to
implement evidence-based guidelines. For example, in cases where physicians feel the links
between the behavior being promoted and outcomes are weak, take-up of the guideline may
be poor. Take-up may also be hindered where guidelines promote abandonment of tasks
that are “codified” or embedded in daily routines, as may be the case in PSA screening
and mammography. From a policy perspective, this literature suggests that any efforts to
intervene to promote the take-up of guidelines (e.g., with educational initiatives) will need
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to be tailored to group organization (including size) and culture, as well as to the type of
guideline being implemented, in order to be successful.
Finally, the literature on organizational change documents both technical and non-technical
reasons for change. Disentangling these forces and understanding how they interact will be
important in promoting the adoption and abandonment of innovations. In this dissertation,
I examine how group size and peer effects interact to impact physician decisions to disadopt
previously routine services. I contribute to the literature on the implications of group
organization for physician behavior by considering the costs and benefits of learning from
and conforming to three different types of peers in a large population of physicians. In
addition, as far as I am aware, this is the first study of the effects of organization, including
peers, on the disadoption of a service; other papers have generally considered the adoption
of new drugs and technologies. Finally, I study the interaction of peer effects and group size,
which may lend important insights into how information and technology diffuse in different
types of health care delivery settings.
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CHAPTER 3 : Estimating the Effect of Organization on Physician Disadoption
3.1. Empirical Strategy
The overall goal of the analysis presented in this dissertation is to study the role of group
organization in physician decisions to provide and disadopt low-value services following
the release of new clinical guidelines. In particular, I am interested in the influence of a
physician’s peers on his or her behavior and whether this influence varies across provider
groups of different sizes. I adopt a latent variable setting, where a physician j ’s disadoption
decision at time t, disadoptjt , is observed but the net benefit of disadoption, disadopt∗jt , is
not observed. In this setting,

disadoptjt =




1,

if disadopt∗jt > 0;



0,

if disadopt∗jt ≤ 0.

I define disadopt∗jt as a function of peer benefits (gained through conformity with peers)
and stand-alone benefits (e.g., doing the “right thing” for patients, which I refer to broadly
as altruism), offset by the cost of learning and coordination with peers. More precisely:
disadopt∗jt = αP eerConf ormity(N )jt + τ Altruismj − βC(N )jt + γj + δt + jt

(3.1)

Where γj captures time-invariant, physician-specific preferences (physician fixed effects), δt
captures time effects, and jt captures unobserved heterogeneity. Note that altruism is also
time-invariant and physician-specific. Both the benefits of peer conformity, P eerConf ormity(N )jt ,
and the costs of conformity, C(N )jt , are defined as functions of group size, N, allowing peer
effects to vary by group size. In this set-up, the relative costs and benefits of conforming
with peers will determine the overall peer effect on disadoption.
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3.1.1. Effects of Different Types of Peers
The effect of peers on individual physician behavior may depend on the type of peer. One
group of peers consists of “local” peers with whom the physician practices on a daily basis.
These local peers practice in the same location (at the same address) and may be a standalone group or one site of a multi-site group. As discussed in Chapter 2, previous work in
organizational theory and economics suggests that these local peers may have substantial
impact on the behavior of an individual in the same group through normative and culture
influence. This social influence can exist within a group where all members are located
in the same physical space since pressure to conform depends on group members being
able to observe each others’ behavior (Manski, 2000; Kiesler and Cummings, 2002; Bosk,
2003; Iyengar et al., 2015). Other work has also demonstrated that co-location, leading to
visibility of peer behavior, plays an important role in peer effects. For example, Mas and
Moretti (2009) find that productivity spillovers from faster to slower supermarket cashiers
only occur when the more productive workers can see less productive workers, suggesting to
the authors that the mechanism driving spillovers is social pressure (rather than altruistic
or cooperative behavior).
Physicians may also be influenced by other physicians with whom they share patients, for
example, through referral-based relationships between primary care providers and specialists. There is evidence that, in particular, PCPs rely on their relationships with specialists
whom they see as “opinion leaders” for clinical advice, including information regarding clinical guidelines and adoption of new products (Nair et al., 2010; Iyengar et al., 2011). Other
work has confirmed that sharing patients as captured in administrative data is a valid
measure of physician relationships (Barnett et al., 2011).
To capture the effects of these different types of peers, I define “local,”“sharing,” and “localsharing” peers. As the names suggest, “local” peers are defined as all members of physician
j ’s group (with whom physician j may or may not share patients). These “local” peers are
defined based on practice location in order to capture the effect of peers who practice in
24

the same office as a given individual, making it more likely that these peers will be subject
to the same norms and able to engage in regular face-to-face communication. “Sharing”
peers are defined as any physician with whom physician j shares patients in a given quarter
(at physician j ’s location or not), and “local-sharing” peers are defined as the subset of
physicians within physician j ’s group (at the same location) with whom physician j shares
patients. I am primarily interested in comparing the effects of “local” and “sharing” peers
(there are relatively few “local-sharing”physicians who are in the same location and share
patients).
Group size-dependent peer effects may exist, particularly among local peers. The interaction between peer effects and group size is largely untested in the economics and health
literatures. Local peer effects may get stronger as more members conform, though the
health literature has suggested that large groups may be less cohesive and members may be
less likely to communicate and more likely to compete, which may threaten social norms in
large groups (Curoe et al., 2003; Wheelan, 2009). Thus, the interaction of different types
of peer effects with group size (as well as which types of peers are influential in physicians’
disadoption decisions) must be evaluated empirically.
3.1.2. Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Estimates of Peer Effects
The basic framework for analyzing the disadoption of low-value services, using PSA testing
and mammography as settings, views the decision to disadopt or continue to provide as a
function of physician preferences, peer effects, and group size. My empirical strategy aims
to assess the role of peer effects on PSA and mammography provision, explore whether these
effects vary across group size, and finally, use a difference-in-differences framework to test the
relative importance of peer effects, after relative to before the USPSTF recommendations,
and across groups of different sizes.
My preferred specification uses dynamic panel methods to test the effects of peer use on
physician use. I choose this approach for the following reasons: first, the panel has many
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individual providers but relatively few years (2007-2013), second, the dependent variable
(physician j ’s PSA or mammography use) is very likely to depend on its past realization
(i.e., use in the previous period(s)) and thus I would like to include lags of the dependent
variable in the regression, third, the key independent variable, peer use, may not be strictly
exogenous, fourth, I need to control for unobserved provider effects, and, finally, there may
be autocorrelation in the panel (Roodman, 2009; Mileva, 2007). To illustrate, consider
a simplified version of a model of peer effects on physician PSA use, controlling for past
physician use:

U sejt = β1 U sej,t−1 + β2 P eerEf f ectjt + jt

(3.2)

Where U sejt is PSA use (proportion of eligible patients receiving a PSA test) by provider
j at time t and P eerEf f ectjt captures PSA use among provider j ’s peers at time t (the
construction of the peer effect measure is discussed further below). Physician j ’s use in the
previous period is included as a regressor along with peer use. The error term consists of
unobserved provider-specific effects, vj , and the observation-specific errors, ujt :

jt = vj + ujt

(3.3)

The goal is to obtain consistent estimates of β2 , the effect of peer use on physician j ’s use.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) and the within fixed effects (FE) estimator are inconsistent
when lag(s) of the dependent variable are included in the regression and errors may be
serially correlated. The FE estimator removes fixed effects by mean-differencing, and thus
the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the error term when the individual
mean is differenced out.1 OLS estimation of the first-differenced data (FD estimator) also
produces inconsistent estimates because the first-differenced lagged dependent variable is
correlated with the first-differenced error term.
1

The first regressor, when mean differenced, U sej,t−1 − U sej , is correlated with the error, jt − j since
U sej,t−1 is correlated with j,t−1 and therefore with j . See Cameron and Trivedi (2009).
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Higher lags, however, may be used to instrument for the lagged dependent variable in the
FD model since the error term is uncorrelated with these higher lags (Cameron and Trivedi,
2009). This is the premise of the Arellano-Bond (AB) generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), originally proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1988). The AB estimator implements instrumental variable estimation of the FD model
where lags of the regressors are used as instruments to obtain consistent estimates. The
AB estimator removes the provider-specific effects by first-differencing (rather than meandifferencing) and allows for lags of the dependent variable to be included as regressors and
instrumented with its past levels. The FD model transforms equation (3.2) into:

∆U sejt = β1 ∆U sej,t−1 + β2 ∆P eerEf f ectjt + ∆jt

(3.4)

∆jt = ∆vj + ∆ujt

(3.5)

Where

And therefore the provider-specific effects, vj , are removed:

jt − j,t−1 = (vj − vj ) + (ujt − uj,t−1 ) = ujt − uj,t−1

(3.6)

Further, the AB estimator can incorporate lagged levels of the independent variable P eerEf f ectjt ,
so that this variable is pre-determined; it may be correlated with past errors but not with
contemporaneous or future errors. As with the lagged dependent variable, peer use and
lagged peer use are instrumented using higher lags of the same variable. Finally, the optimal GMM estimator can be used to obtain standard errors that are robust to panel-specific
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and finite-sample corrected (Windmeijer, 2005). The
critical assumption for the AB estimator is that the errors are serially uncorrelated. I test
this assumption following estimation. To maximize efficiency, I use the system GMM esti-
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mator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which allows
for more instruments and results in improved efficiency, precision, and finite-sample properties compared to the basic AB difference estimator. The “system” estimator refers to
two-equation system: the original levels equation[(3.2)] and the first-differenced equation,
where variables in the levels equation are instrumented for using their own first differences
(in contrast to the “difference” AB estimator, where differences are instrumented for with
past levels). The system estimator imposes an additional assumption that the first differences of the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects (Roodman, 2009;
Mileva, 2007).2
The model that I estimate using the AB estimator is an autoregressive model of order 3
in physician use [AR(3) model]. Thus, it includes three lags of the dependent variable and
contemporaneous peer effects as well as one lag of the peer effect (with two additional lags
used as instruments) on the right-hand side.3 I also include month dummies to control for
time-specific common shocks. The first estimating equation tests the effects of the three
different types of peers (local, sharing, and local-sharing) on physician use of low-value
services (PSA or mammography) over the full time period. Where coefficients are summed
for ease of notation, coefficients on lags are noted by ` (individual provider subscripts, j,
are omitted for simplicity):

U set =β0 + β1 U set−1 + β2 U set−2 + β3 U set−3 +

(3.7)

Σp λp P eerEf f ectp,t + Σp λp` P eerEf f ectp,t−1 + δt + t

Where p indexes the three types of peer effects, p ∈ {local, sharing, local-sharing}, and δ
indexes months. Thus, the λp coefficients are the main coefficients of interest, capturing the
contemporaneous effects of local, sharing, and local-sharing peers on physician j ’s use.
Second, I estimate peer effects by group size. I categorize providers in groups into the
2
3

The system GMM estimator is computed using xtdpdsys in Stata.
Note that results are generally robust to changing the number of lags of the dependent variable.
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following group size categories: 2-5 physicians, 6-10 physicians, 11-30 physicians, and >30
physicians and introduce indicators for the categories as interaction terms with peer effects
(groups of 2-5 physicians are the omitted category); s indexes these group size categories:

U set =β0 + β1 U set−1 + β2 U set−2 + β3 U set−3 +

(3.8)

Σp λp P eerEf f ectp,t + Σp λp` P eerEf f ectp,t−1 + Σs φs GroupSizes +
Σps αps (P eerEf f ectp ∗ GrpSzs )t + Σps α`ps (P eerEf f ectp ∗ GrpSzs )t−1 + δt + t

After assessing peer effects over the entire time period, I consider the response to the release
of the USPSTF recommendations on PSA screening and mammography using a differencein-differences framework where the coefficients of interest (ω p ) capture the impact of peer
behavior post- vs. pre-recommendation (“post”-recommendation is defined as May 2012 and
after, through December 2013 for the PSA analysis and November 2009 and after in the
mammography analysis):

U set =β0 + β1 U set−1 + β2 U set−2 + β3 U set−3 +

(3.9)

Σp λp P eerEf f ectp,t + Σp λp` P eerEf f ectp,t−1 +
Σp ω p (P eerEf f ectp ∗ P ost)t + Σp ω`p (P eerEf f ectp ∗ P ost)t−1 + P ost + δt + t

Finally, I estimate the full model to assess the relative impact of peer effects in different
sized physician groups, pre- vs. post-USPSTF recommendation. The coefficients on the
triple interaction terms of peer effects, group size, and the “post” indicator (η ps ) in the
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estimating equation below capture these relative effects:

U set =β0 + β1 U set−1 + β2 U set−2 + β3 U set−3 +

(3.10)

Σp λp P eerEf f ectp,t + Σp λp` P eerEf f ectp,t−1 + Σs φs GroupSizes +
Σps αps (P eerEf f ectp ∗ GrpSzs )t + Σps α`ps (P eerEf f ectp ∗ GrpSzs )t−1 +
Σp ω p (P eerEf f ectp ∗ P ost)t + Σp ω`p (P eerEf f ectp ∗ P ost)t−1 + Σs θs GrpSzs ∗ P ost+
Σps η ps (P eerEf f ectp ∗ GrpSzs ∗ P ost)t + Σps η`ps (P eerEf f ectp ∗ GrpSzs ∗ P ost)t−1 +
P ost + δt + t

As robustness checks, I use standard fixed effects and first differences methods to estimate models analogous to the main specifications shown above in equations (3.7) - (3.10).
Physician (γ) and time (δ) fixed effects are included to control for time-invariant physician
qualities such as practice style and ability, and to mitigate concerns about selection into
their medical group (and therefore choice of peers), which is often an issue in peer effects
analysis. I discuss identification concerns further in the next section.

3.2. Identification of Peer Effects
Studies highlight three key identification challenges in documenting peer effects: (i) endogenous group formation, (ii) correlated unobservables, and (iii) simultaneity of individual and
peer behavior (termed the “reflection problem” by Manski (1993)). These challenges have
been extensively documented and described (Manski, 1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2001), thus
I focus on a brief description of each in the context of physician peer effects in groups and a
discussion of how I attempt to address each issue in my analysis by using the Arellano-Bond
estimator.
Endogenous group formation would arise in this setting if physicians select their peer group
(by choosing their practice) based on the presence of other physicians with similar preferences for provision of PSA tests or mammograms or other services that may be correlated
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with PSA testing or mammogram provision (e.g., a general taste for “intensity”). If selection exists, a significant relationship between group behavior and member behavior may
not reflect peer influences but instead individual characteristics that are correlated within
the group. Of course, it is almost certainly true that physicians self-select into groups based
on the treatment styles and preferences of other physicians in that group. Previous authors have mitigated concerns regarding endogenous group formation by using panel data
which allow for inclusion of physician-specific fixed effects to control for any time-invariant
physician characteristics and preferences (Nair et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2014; Arcidiacono
and Nicholson, 2005; Huesch, 2011). The AB estimator similarly removes physician-specific
effects through first-differencing, enabling me to control for these individual-specific unobservables. It is also worth noting that the primary aim of this paper is to compare peer
effects across different types of peers (i.e., local vs. sharing peers) and selection issues are
unlikely to differ across these peer types in a manner that threatens comparison.
Correlated unobservables refer to common shocks (e.g., awareness initiatives, group resources) that affect usage of both the physician and her peer group which would be reflected in the peer effects measure if not appropriately accounted for. Time- and location
(e.g., region, group)-specific fixed effects can be used to control for unobservables that are
correlated and vary over time and location, respectively (Yang et al., 2014; Arcidiacono and
Nicholson, 2005). Other researchers have controlled for time-period and location-specific
shocks by including the local average of the behavior under consideration, which proxies
for all unobservable time- and location-specific shocks that are common to peer group and
provider (Nair et al., 2010). I include time-specific fixed effects and have limited concerns
about the need for region-specific controls since the great majority of the providers in my
sample are from a relatively localized region around Philadelphia.
The final major challenge in the identification of peer effects is simultaneity, which refers to
the possibility that the provider’s action and the action of others in the provider’s group are
contemporaneously interdependent (the “reflection problem” discussed by Manski (1993)).
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If simultaneity exists, peer effects estimates are biased. Researchers have mitigated simultaneity concerns in several ways, including lagging the measured behavior of the peer group
(Huesch, 2011), using falsification tests to check the presence of simultaneity (Yang et al.,
2014), and using instruments for peer behavior (Nair et al., 2010). The AB estimator offers an advantage over other models in terms of mitigating simultaneity concerns; rather
than directly including contemporaneous peer effects in the regression model, contemporaneous and once-lagged peer effects are instrumented with higher lags of peer effects, which
are generally accepted as not suffering from correlation with current (or first-differenced)
errors.
Thus, the strategy of instrumental variable estimation of parameters in first-difference models offers several advantages in the estimation of peer effects. First, physician-level fixed
effects are first-differenced out, reducing concerns of capturing endogenous group formation
in peer effects estimates; second, peer usage is instrumented for with higher lags to address
the potential of simultaneous determination of current individual physician and peer behavior and allow the peer effect to enter as pre-determined or weakly endogenous rather
than assuming exogeneity; and third, the estimator allows for the inclusion of exogenous
variables such as month indicators to control for time-specific common shocks.

3.3. Measurement of Peer Effects
I distinguish among three types of physician j ’s (in group g in time t) peers: “local” peers,
defined as all physicians within the medical group in which physician j practices at time t;
“sharing” peers, defined as all physicians with whom physician j shares patients in a given
quarter; and “local-sharing” peers, defined as physicians within physician j ’s group (at j ’s
location) with whom physician j shares patients in a given quarter.4 Using these definitions
4
Previous evidence suggests that patient-sharing is a useful predictor of physician relationships and can
be used to map a physician’s network and assess the strength of connections among physicians (Barnett
et al., 2011), which can be especially useful when only administrative data are available. Several papers have
used patient-sharing to map physician networks to study costs and quality of coordinated care (Pollack et al.,
2013), hospital costs and intensity of care (Barnett et al., 2012), variation in prostate cancer treatment in
three cities (Pollack et al., 2012), and to map “naturally occurring” physician networks that could potentially
be used as the basis for accountable care organizations (Landon et al., 2013).
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of peers, I construct three measures of peer use of low-value services for physician j in group
g, at time t:
P
µjgt =

αjt =

i useigt

Ngt − 1

X
[ωjit ∗ useit ]

(3.11)

(3.12)

i

αjgt =

X

[ωjigt ∗ useigt ]

(3.13)

i

Where j indexes the “focal” physician, i indexes peer physicians, g indexes groups, and t
indexes time. Peer use is captured by useit , the proportion of physician i ’s eligible patients
who receive the low-value service at time t. ωjit measures the proportion of patients that
physician j shares in a given quarter that is shared with physician i and and ωjigt is the
same measure except that it is limited to physicians within group g with whom physician j
shares patients. Thus, ωjit provides a measure of the strength of the relationship between
physician j and physician i.
Measure (3.11) captures peer effects among “local” peers, measure (3.12) captures peer
effects among “sharing” peers, and measure (3.13) captures the influence of “local-sharing”
peers. Specifically, (3.12) and (3.13) are weighted averages of peer PSA or mammography
use where peers are defined as physicians with whom physician j shares patients (across all
groups and within physician j ’s group, respectively) and weights are based on the extent of
patient-sharing between physicians j and i.5
Measure (3.11) reflects average behavior among all group members; it is the mean PSA or
mammography rate in group g (among physician j ’s peers, excluding physician j ’s rate),
5
These measures are based on sharing similar types of patients; for the PSA analysis, for example,
physicians must share at least one male patient over the age of 49 without any PSA-related complicating
conditions.
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weighting each group member equally. It is important to note that both (3.11) and (3.13)
are within-group measures (and therefore can only be estimated for providers who practice
in groups, i.e., not are not solo providers) while (3.12) can be estimated for all providers,
including solo practitioners.
With this general framework and empirical strategy in place, I present applications to PSA
testing and mammography in the following two chapters.

34

CHAPTER 4 : Physician Provision of PSA Testing
4.1. USPSTF Recommendation on PSA-based Screening for Prostate Cancer
Prostate cancer is the most common non-skin cancer diagnosed in the U.S., with some
233,000 new cases and 29,480 deaths reported in 2014 (Moyer, 2012).1 The prostate-specific
antigen (PSA) test measures the level of antigen (protein produced by the cells of the
prostate gland) in a man’s blood; this level is typically elevated in men with prostate
cancer. The test was originally approved by the FDA in 1986 as a means of monitoring
the progression of cancer in men who had been diagnosed and in 1994, the FDA approved
the PSA test plus a digital rectal exam as a way of testing asymptomatic men for prostate
cancer.2 The use of PSA screening became part of the routine annual physical exam for
men beginning at age 50, but concerns about the potential harms of testing emerged. PSA
levels can fluctuate due to a number of different conditions and medications, leading to
uncertainty about the optimal upper level of the “normal” PSA range. Further, evidence
emerged that showed that a sizable proportion of men with PSA levels above the normal
range did not have prostate cancer (false positives) and that cancer was “not rare” in men
with PSA levels in the normal range (Thompson et al., 2004). False positives, in particular,
raised concerns that men were being treated for cancers that would never have been detected
without screening, leading to costly and psychologically traumatic cancer treatment which
could have adverse side effects and lead to potential complications.
The United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), an independent, volunteer
panel of experts in prevention and evidence-based medicine created in 1984, makes recommendations regarding a range of clinical preventive services based on benefits vs. harms
of the particular service and the strength of the supporting evidence. The USPSTF issues
letter grades to each recommendation to capture whether the service is recommended or
not, and the strength of the recommendation. Figure 1, taken from the USPSTF website,
1

Number of cases and deaths reported at: http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/prostate
For information on prostate cancer and the pros and cons of PSA screening, see the National Cancer
Institute’s website: http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/prostate.
2

35

summarizes what the grades mean and associated suggestions for practice.3
Figure 1: Meanings of USPSTF grades and suggestions for practice

In 2008, the USPSTF reviewed the evidence on PSA screening for prostate cancer and
deemed it insufficient to make a recommendation for all men, though they did recommend
against screening in men age 75 or above. Evidence suggests that this recommendation led
to a decline in PSA rates among men age 75 or above of about eight percentage points,
though a sizable portion of these men continued to receive PSA tests (Howard et al., 2013).
In 2009, two major randomized controlled trials were published in the New England Journal
of Medicine studying the relationship between screening and prostate cancer mortality and
finding no or very small benefits from screening. The American Prostate, Lung, Colorectal,
and Ovarian (PLCO) Cancer Screening Trial randomized men to receive either usual care
or annual screening. They found that after seven to ten years of follow-up, prostate cancer
mortality did not differ significantly between the two groups (Andriole et al., 2009). The
second study, the European Randomized Study of Screening for Prostate Cancer (ERSPC),
took place in seven European countries and found a significant absolute reduction of 0.71
3

Note that these definitions apply to recommendations only after July 2012 when the definition of and
suggestions for practice for the grade C recommendation were changed. This is noted in the text where
applicable.
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prostate cancer deaths per 1,000 men tested (with an average follow-up of about nine years).
This study also found a high rate of overdiagnosis (cancers diagnosed in men who would
not have had clinical symptoms in their lifetimes), as high as 50 percent. Further, among
men who had elevated levels in the PSA test and proceeded to biopsy stage, over 75 percent
had false positive results (Schröder et al., 2009).
Based on these new trial results, the USPSTF recommendation statement on screening for
prostate cancer among all men was published in 2012 in Annals of Internal Medicine (Moyer,
2012). A draft recommendation had been posted for public comment on the USPSTF website from October 11 to December 13, 2011. In their recommendation, the USPSTF reviewed
clinical evidence on the benefits and harms of PSA-based screening for prostate cancer and
recommended against PSA-based screening in the general U.S. population (“grade D”). The
recommendation did not include PSA use for surveillance after diagnosis or treatment of
prostate cancer. The USPSTF concluded that the reduction in prostate cancer due to
screening was “at most, very small,” and that the benefits do not outweigh the harms,
which include physical side effects of screening (pain, fever, bleeding, infection, urinary difficulties), psychological adverse effects due to false positives, and potential harm due to
treatment for cancer that, in many cases, may never have become symptomatic.4
It is important to note that other professional societies and associations have not made
as strong a recommendation against PSA screening as that of the USPSTF. For example,
the American Urological Association recommends against screening in men under 40 and
against routine screening in men between the ages of 40 and 54. For men between 55 and
69, the Association recommends “shared decision-making...and proceeding based on a man’s
values and preferences.”5 Similarly, the American Cancer Society “recommends that men
make an informed decision with their doctor about whether to be tested for prostate cancer”
4

In their review of the evidence, the USPSTF estimated that for every 1,000 men between 55 and 69
who are screened every 1 to 4 years for a decade, 0-1 death from prostate cancer would be avoided while
100-120 men would receive a false positive result that could cause anxiety and lead to further testing, which
could have adverse side effects, and 110 would be diagnosed with prostate cancer, of whom at least 50 would
have treatment complications (Moyer, 2012).
5
https://www.auanet.org/education/guidelines/prostate-cancer-detection.cfm
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and says that “research has not yet proven that the potential benefits of testing outweigh
the harms of testing and treatment.”6

4.2. Claims and Provider Data
I use detailed claims data from a major insurer in the Southeast Pennsylvania region from
2007-2013. For this analysis, I include claims associated with male enrollees over the age of
49 who are not diagnosed with a condition that might make a PSA test appropriate (e.g., a
family or personal history of prostate cancer). I discuss the sample selection further below.
The dataset includes over 1.5 million claim lines from over 230,000 individuals covered by
private insurance as well as Medicare Advantage; each claim is associated with a date,
provider, diagnosis codes (ICD-9 codes), procedure codes (Healthcare Common Procedure
Coding System or HCPCS codes), amount reimbursed, location (address) of service as well
as type of service location (e.g., physician office), and insurance information. Where the
claim is for a test or procedure conducted by a vendor such as a laboratory or outpatient
testing center, the claim is also associated with a “referring” provider. Using the primary or
“referring provider” identifier as appropriate, I link claims data to provider-level information
on provider name and location, specialty, “type” (solo vs. group), and any affiliation(s) to
one or more medical groups or practices.
As noted above, I restrict the overall sample from both the patient and physician sides. On
the patient side, I (i) include only male patients over age 49 and (ii) exclude patients with
PSA-related complicating conditions which might make a PSA test appropriate, including
a personal or family history of prostate cancer. On the provider side, I restrict the sample
to urologists and primary care providers (defined as providers who report their specialty
to be internal medicine, general practice, or family practice) who see five or more “eligible”
patients in a year, where eligibility is defined as males aged 50 years or above without any
PSA-related complicating conditions. I also exclude claims that are associated with hospital
6

http://www.cancer.org/healthy/findcancerearly/cancerscreeningguidelines/american-cancer-societyguidelines-for-the-early-detection-of-cancer
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visits since I am primarily interested in PSA tests ordered in the physician office setting.
The final analytic data set includes 421,689 physician-months, with an average of 6,500
distinct physicians per month.
Over half of the sample are family practice practitioners and close to 40 percent are internal
medicine practitioners. Only five percent of providers are urology specialists. In terms of
group size, close to 25 percent of providers in my data are solo practitioners. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of providers across group practices of different sizes for physicians in groups
of two or more. Just over a third of physicians are in groups of 2-5 and 17 percent are in
groups of 6-10. Just over a quarter are in groups of 11-30 providers, with the remaining 22
percent in groups of over 30.
Figure 2: Group size distribution of providers in the data

The key outcome of interest is provision of PSA testing. I measure this with a continuous
measure of the percentage of “eligible” patients who receive a PSA test, where “eligible”
patients are defined as above. I count a patient as having received a PSA test if the HCPCS
code associated with the claim was 84152, 84153, 84154, or G0103 (Howard et al., 2013).
Omitting those with PSA-relevant complicating conditions (including a personal or family
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history of prostate cancer as well as a range of urinary tract and related diagnoses) allows
me to conclude that when a PSA test is provided in my data it can be considered to be a
low-value service. If the USPSTF recommendation results in disadoption of PSA testing,
we would expect this measure to decrease following the recommendation.
The main explanatory variables of interest are group size and peer effects. I construct the
measure of group size based on the number of providers affiliated with a given group in a
given month. Importantly, though my provider sample includes only urologists and primary
care providers treating “eligible” patients as defined above, I construct group size based on
all providers in the claims data affiliated with the given group in that month. It is possible
that my group size measure underestimates true group size if there are providers in groups
who do not see patients covered by the insurer; the insurer’s large market share, however,
mitigates this concern to a certain extent.

4.3. PSA Provision and Disadoption Trends
Figure 3 shows the percent of eligible patients (as defined above) who received a PSA test
by quarter (physician-month level measure of the percent of a physician’s eligible patients
receiving a PSA test). As discussed above, I omit any patients with PSA-related complicating conditions (e.g., a family history of prostate cancer) which may require a clinicallyappropriate PSA test. (Thus, I assume that PSA tests that eligible patients received are
of low or no value per clinical guidelines.) Two key findings emerge from this graph. First,
PSA provision is relatively low. Of all male patients over 50 with no PSA-related complicating condition, only 0.40 percent (maximum) received a PSA test in a given quarter. The
second take-away from this graph is that there was a substantial decline in PSA provision
following the release of the preliminary USPSTF recommendation in October 2011 (line (2)
on the graph). Rates continued to fall following the final recommendation in May 2012 (line
(3) on graph). By the end of 2013, only about 0.05 percent of eligible patients received a
PSA test in a given quarter.

40

Figure 3: Percent of eligible patients receiving a PSA test

Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the percent of eligible patients who received a PSA test by quarter
by provider specialty, type, and group size, respectively (the vertical line in these graphs
marks when the preliminary USPSTF recommendation on PSA screening was released).
Figure 4 illustrates that urologists (right axis) provide PSA tests at a higher rate than
primary care physicians (left axis). The substantial decline in PSA tests following the
USPSTF recommendation is driven largely by urologists as well as by family practitioners.
Overall, solo providers and those in group settings order PSA tests at approximately the
same rates; rates among both types of practitioners fell following the USPSTF report (Figure
5). Figure 6 shows that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in PSA provision rates
across providers in groups of different sizes. For ease of reading the graph, I show sixmonthly rates of PSA provision for each of the four categories of physician group size. This
graph indicates that the biggest percentage decline in PSA provision around the time of the
USPSTF recommendation (the graph provides a rough measure of this, the change from

41

July-December 2011 to January-June 2012) was among providers in groups of 11-30 (drop
from 0.29 percent to 0.09 percent), though there were also sizable drops in the other group
size categories.
Figure 4: Percent of eligible patients receiving a PSA test by provider specialty

Figure 5: Percent of eligible patients receiving a PSA test, solo vs. group providers
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Figure 6: Percent of eligible patients receiving a PSA test by provider group size

Another measure of how widespread PSA ordering practices are is the percent of providers
who order PSA tests for any of their patients; Figure 7 shows this percentage over time.
This figure suggests that PSA provision is concentrated among a relatively small population
of physicians - about six percent of physicians (150 physicians) at maximum. As with PSA
provision rates, there is a noticeable decline in the percent of physicians ordering PSA tests
following the USPSTF recommendation in October 2011. Also consistent with trends in
PSA provision, the data suggest that the decline in the number and percent of physicians
ordering PSA tests was driven by urologists and providers in relatively larger groups.

4.4. Peer Effects in Physician PSA Provision and Disadoption
Tables 1 - 4 present estimates of peer effects on physician PSA provision using the ArellanoBond (AB) estimator in different group sizes, pre vs. post the release of the USPSTF recommendation. In the summary tables presented in this section, I show only contemporaneous
effects from the AB estimation; full results can be found in the appendix. Table 1 presents
estimates of (3.7) in column (1) and (3.8) in column (2). Estimates in column (1) show that
local peer PSA use (“Local PE”) is significantly and positively associated with physician
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Figure 7: Percent of providers who order PSA testing

PSA use while shared peer use is not.7 The coefficient on “Local PE” suggests that if an
individual physician’s local peers increase their use of PSA testing by some factor X, the
individual provider will increase his or her usage by about half of X. As seen in the full
table in the Appendix, lagged peer use estimates are not significant, though estimates of
the lagged dependent variables are significant and positive (though small), indicating that,
as expected, past use is associated with current use. Using the AB test for serial correlation
in the first-differenced residuals there is no evidence of serial correlation at order 2 (p =
0.235) or order 3 (p = 0.118).
Column 2 shows estimates of (3.8), the differential effects of local and shared peers in groups
of different sizes. These estimates suggest that the overall effect of local peers in groups of
6-10 and groups of over 30 providers is near zero. In groups of 11-30 providers, however,
there is a positive and significant effect of local peers, suggesting that local peer effects are
strongest in these medium-sized groups. In contrast to local peer effects, shared peer effects
are not significant in groups of any size.8
7
Coefficients on local-shared peer use can be found in the Appendix; these effects are consistently insignificant, likely due in part to the fact that there are relatively few physician who share with other physicians
within the same group.
8
Overall, just over half of physicians in an average quarter share patients with at least one other provider.
Providers in group practices are more likely to share patients than solo practitioners, and sharing rates are
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Table 1: Contemporaneous Peer Effects on PSA Use, Overall and by Provider Group Size

Local P Et
Shared P Et

(1)
0.472***
[0.23, 0.71]
-0.052
[-0.21, 0.11]

GrpSz6-10*Local P Et
GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
GrpSz6-10*Shared P Et
GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

84,958

(2)
0.348***
[0.23, 0.47]
-0.127
[-1.01, 0.76]
-0.394**
[-0.73, -0.05]
0.264***
[0.09, 0.44]
-0.228**
[-0.45, -0.01]
-0.049
[-3.35, 3.26]
0.074
[-0.87, 1.02]
0.115
[-0.81, 1.04]
84,958

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of PSA-eligible patients receiving PSA tests.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean PSA rate in physician j’s group g at time t
excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of PSA rates among physicians
with whom physician j shares patients at time t.

higher in urology than in primary care specialties. The percent of providers sharing any patients generally
increases with provider group size. On average, about 15% of a provider’s patients in a given quarter are
shared with other physicians, and the mean number of physicians with whom the focal provider shares
patients in a given quarter is 1.85. As with the likelihood and level of sharing, specialists share patients with
more physicians than primary care physicians, as do providers in bigger groups. Note that approximately
75% of “sharing” relationships are between PCPs and specialists. Results are consistent when estimated
considering only these referral-based relationships in the shared peer effect.
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Table 2 shows estimates of equations (3.9) and (3.10). Again, contemporaneous effects are
shown in the summary table and full estimates can be found in the Appendix. In column (1),
the main coefficients of interest are the interactions between the post-USPSTF recommendation period indicator and peer effects. The coefficients on these interactions show that,
overall, there were no differential effects of peers following the USPSTF recommendation
relative to before the recommendation. Previous results, however, suggested that local peer
effects are strongest in medium-sized groups, and, indeed, when I include triple interactions
of an indicator for the post-recommendation period, group size, and peer effects [column
(2)], I find that local peer effects on PSA use were relatively greater in medium-sized groups
compared to smaller and bigger groups, after relative to before the recommendation (coefficient = 0.420, p = 0.045). These results indicate that a physician whose peers continue to
provide PSA testing following the new recommendation is also more likely to continue providing the service, and that the effect of their peers is greater following the recommendation
and in medium-sized physician groups. This finding suggests that local behavior may play
an important role in physician decisions about whether or not to abandon a service, even
in the presence of clinical evidence demonstrating its low value.
Tables 3 and 4 show estimates from standard FD (first differences) and FE (fixed effects)
estimation of peer effects on physician PSA use. The models estimated are analogous to the
AB models shown in equations (3.7) - (3.10), though of course without the lagged variables.
The results are generally consistent. As with Table 1, Table 3 shows estimates of peer
effects overall and by group size (again, I show the main coefficients of interest here, with
full results available in the Appendix). These estimates provide supporting evidence that
local peer effects have a positive and significant impact on physician PSA use, while shared
peer effects show no systematic significance. FE estimates in column (4) support the finding
that local peer effects are strongest in groups of 11-30 physicians, though the FD estimates
do not show differentially larger peer effects in these groups relative to groups of 6-10 or
over 30.
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Table 2: Contemporaneous Peer Effects on PSA Use After the USPSTF Recommendation
Change, Overall and by Provider Group Size
(1)
-0.266
[-0.70, 0.17]
-1.087
[-8.34, 6.16]

Post*Local P Et
Post*Shared P Et
Post*GrpSz6-10*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

84,958

(2)
-0.776**
[-1.44, -0.11]
0.672
[-5.66, 7.00]
-1.677
[-98.35, 95.00]
0.420**
[0.06, 0.78]
0
[0.00, 0.00]
0
[0.00, 0.00]
84,958

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of PSA-eligible patients receiving PSA tests.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean PSA rate in physician j’s group g at time t
excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of PSA rates among physicians
with whom physician j shares patients at time t.
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Table 4, analogous to Table 2, shows estimates of the differential effects of local and shared
peers after relative to before the USPSTF recommendation, overall [columns (1) - (2)] and
by group size [columns (3) - (4)]. Both the FD and FE estimates suggest that overall,
local peer effects were relatively stronger in the post-recommendation period relative to
the pre-period [Post*Local PE coefficient, columns (1) - (2)]. While the overall results in
column (1) and (2) suggest that shared peer effects may have a differentially more negative
effect in the post-recommendation period, these findings do not hold up systematically
when results by group size are considered. Both the FE and FD estimates in columns
(3) - (4) show significant and positive local peer effects in medium-sized groups, relative
to smaller and bigger groups, after relative to before the recommendation [Post*Grpsz1130*Local PE coefficient]. Though I do not find differential overall local peer effects following
the recommendation using the AB estimator, the positive and significant triple interaction
effect of local peer use in groups of 11-30 post-recommendation is consistent with earlier
findings. Thus, the FD and FE estimates are generally consistent with my preferred AB
specification.
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Table 3: First Differences and Fixed Effect Estimates of Peer Effects on PSA Use, Overall and By Provider Group Size

Local P Et
Shared P Et

(1)
First differences
0.110**
[0.00, 0.22]
0.007
[-0.06, 0.07]

(2)
Fixed effects
0.168**
[0.04, 0.30]
0.015
[-0.02, 0.05]

201,975

211,718

GrpSz6-10*Local P Et
GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
GrpSz6-10*Shared P Et
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GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

(3)
First differences
0
[-0.07, 0.07]
-0.231
[-0.51, 0.05]
0.579***
[0.27, 0.89]
0.394***
[0.17, 0.62]
0.599***
[0.42, 0.78]
0
[-0.00, 0.00]
0
[-0.00, 0.00]
0
[-0.00, 0.00]
201,975

(4)
Fixed effects
-0.006
[-0.08, 0.06]
-0.043
[-0.16, 0.07]
0.034
[-0.06, 0.13]
0.375***
[0.13, 0.62]
0.140***
[0.05, 0.23]
-0.022
[-0.16, 0.12]
0.074
[-0.07, 0.22]
0.066
[-0.05, 0.18]
211,718

Notes:
Main effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Provider and month fixed effects included. SEs clustered at provider level.
Dep var: proportion of PSA-eligible patients receiving PSA tests.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean PSA rate in physician j’s group g at time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of PSA rates among physicians with whom physician j shares patients
at time t.

Table 4: First Differences and Fixed Effect Estimates of Peer Effects on PSA Use After the USPSTF Recommendation Change,
Overall and By Provider Group Size

Post*Local P Et
Post*Shared P Et

(1)
First differences
0.285**
[0.02, 0.55]
-0.539**
[-1.03, -0.05]

(2)
Fixed effects
0.369**
[0.08, 0.66]
-0.314*
[-0.66, 0.03]

201,975

211,718

Post*GrpSz6-10*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
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Post*GrpSz6-10*Shared P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

(3)
First differences
0.053
[-0.05, 0.16]
0.231
[-0.05, 0.51]
-0.467*
[-0.96, 0.03]
0.289*
[-0.03, 0.61]
-0.207
[-0.51, 0.10]
0
[0.00, 0.00]
0
[0.00, 0.00]
-0.871***
[-1.28, -0.46]
201,975

(4)
Fixed effects
0.03
[-0.06, 0.12]
0.025
[-0.09, 0.14]
-0.346
[-0.92, 0.22]
0.353**
[0.05, 0.66]
0.084
[-0.12, 0.28]
0
[0.00, 0.00]
0
[0.00, 0.00]
-0.212
[-0.63, 0.21]
211,718

Notes:
Main effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Provider and month fixed effects included. SEs clustered at provider level.
Dep var: proportion of PSA-eligible patients receiving PSA tests.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean PSA rate in physician j’s group g at time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of PSA rates among physicians with whom physician j shares patients
at time t.

CHAPTER 5 : Physician Provision of Mammography
5.1. USPSTF Recommendation on Mammography-based Screening for Breast Cancer
In the United States, breast cancer is the second most common cancer in women after
skin cancer, with about 230,000 new cases each year and about 40,000 deaths expected in
2015. It is the second leading cause of cancer deaths after lung cancer among women and
the fourth leading cause of cancer death in the United States overall. Incidence is highest
among white women for most age groups, though African American women have higher
incidence rates before 40 years of age and have higher breast cancer mortality rates than
women of any other racial or ethnic group at all ages.1
Mammography is the most common screening test for breast cancer. Mammograms (x-rays
of the breast) can identify tumors that are too small to feel and may also find evidence of
ductal carcinoma in situ, where there are abnormal cells in the lining of the breast duct
which can become cancerous. Mammography gained acceptance as a screening tool in the
mid-1960s and was recommended by the American Cancer Society (ACS) in 1976 for women
age 50 and over yearly. The guideline for women aged 40-49 was to consult their doctor
until 1983 when ACS issued a guideline recommending mammograms for women aged 40-49
every one to two years. In 1997, a new ACS guideline recommended yearly mammograms
for all women over 40, which remains their current recommendation.2
In the first edition of the Guide to Clinical Preventive Services in 1989, the USPSTF reviewed the evidence on mammography and recommended mammography every one to two
years for all women beginning at age 50 and concluding at age 75 (at the time the Task
Force felt that the evidence did not suggest a clear benefit from screening in women aged
40-49 or over 75). The Task Force cited concerns with testing, including false positives and
risks associated with radiation exposure from testing. The results of several large random1

http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/breast.html.
For a history of ACS guidelines, please see: http://www.cancer.org/healthy/findcancerearly/
cancerscreeningguidelines/chronological-history-of-acs-recommendations.
2
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ized controlled trials and other studies, however, demonstrated effectiveness of screening in
women over 50 in terms of reducing mortality (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1989).
The second edition of the Guide was released in 1996; the recommendation in the second
edition was for mammography every one to two years for all women aged 50-69. Again,
the Task Force cited insufficient evidence to recommend for or against routine mammography for women aged 40-49; in this version, they also cited insufficient evidence to make a
recommendation for women above age 70 (previously 75).
In 2002, the USPSTF updated their recommendations on screening for breast cancer to
screening mammography every one to two years for women aged 40 or older. This recommendation received a “B” grade. The associated clinical guidance was that “clinicians
routinely provide [the service] to eligible patients,” suggesting that “The USPSTF found
at least fair evidence that [the service] improves important health outcomes and concludes
that benefits outweigh harms” (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force and others, 2002). The
recommendation notes that the evidence is strongest for women aged 50-69 but that most
studies also indicated a mortality benefit for women undergoing mammography at ages 40
through 49 (they also concluded that the evidence was generalizable for women over 70
years of age).3
Then, in November 2009, the USPSTF re-introduced recommendations by age, recommending against screening in women aged 40-49 years (grade “C,” “The USPSTF recommends
against routinely providing the service. There may be considerations that support providing the service in an individual patient. There is moderate or high certainty that the
net benefit is small” (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force and others, 2009).). The Task
Force based this updated recommendation on a new trial and updated data from an older
study that had been released since the 2002 guideline was issued. They cited psychological
harms, unnecessary imaging tests and biopsies in women without cancer, “inconvenience”
due to false-positive screening results, and overdiagnosis (i.e., treatment of cancers that
3

I include the definitions associated with grades for the 2002 recommendations here because they were
different from those shown in Figure 1, which only apply to recommendations after July 2012.
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would not have become clinically apparent during the woman’s lifetime) as the adverse effects of mammography screening. False-positive results were noted as an especial concern
for women aged 40-49.
A month later, however, the explicit recommendation against routine screening included in
the original recommendation was removed when the USPSTF updated the language of the
“C” grade recommendation for women under 50 to “clarify its original and continued intent”
(U.S. Preventive Services Task Force and others, 2009). The original recommendation read
(emphasis added):

“The USPSTF recommends against routine screening mammography in
women aged 40 to 49 years. The decision to start regular, biennial screening
mammography before the age of 50 years should be an individual one and take
patient context into account, including the patient’s values regarding specific
benefits and harms. This is a C recommendation.”
In December 2009, the first sentence of the above original recommendation was omitted and
thus, the recommendation no longer took the form of a recommendation against screening
in women under 50.
The 2009 guidelines recommended biennial screening for women between 50 and 74 years
of age (grade “B”) and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to make a recommendation for women over the age of 74 (grade “I”). These recommendations applied only to
women who are not at increased risk for breast cancer due to a history of chest radition
or a known underlying genetic mutation (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force and others,
2009).4
4

The mammography guidelines are currently under review again, but the draft recommendation
suggests that the grade “C” and grade “B” recommendations will hold for women aged 40-49 and 50-74,
respectively. The key update with the new recommendation, however, is clarity in the meaning of the
“C” grade. According to the USPSTF draft recommendation, “This recommendation updates the 2009
USPSTF recommendation by providing additional clarity on what is meant by the C recommendation
for women ages 40 to 49 years. A C recommendation is not a recommendation against mammography screening in this age group; it denotes that there is moderate certainty of a small net benefit
in the population. Rather, a C recommendation emphasizes that the decision to screen must be an
individual one, made only after a woman weighs the potential benefit against the possible harms.”
(http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Document/RecommendationStatementDraft/breastcancer-screening1).
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As with PSA screening, it is relevant to note that other professional societies and associations, including the ACS and the American Medical Association, have maintained a
recommendation for annual mammography screening for women beginning at age 40. Others, including the American Academy of Family Physicians and the American College of
Physicians, have endorsed the USPSTF recommendation.
Previous studies of changes in mammography following the 2009 USPSTF recommendation
change have generally found no or small changes in rates. In a recent study, Wharam et al.
(2015) find that annual and biennial mammography rates in 2012 fell by six to 17 percent
among women who were not from black or mixed-race neighborhoods compared to the rate
that would have been predicted by 2005 to 2009 trends in mammography. Women aged 40-49
experienced larger decreases in screening, in line with the new recommendation, compared
to those aged 50-64. In all age groups, White, Hispanic, and Asian women experienced
decreases in annual and biennial screening while black women did not experience any changes
in rates. Two previous studies found decreases of smaller magnitude - ranging from three
to 4.8 percent from 2009 to 2010 (Sharpe et al., 2013; Sprague et al., 2014) while two other
studies found no change in mammography rates after 2009 (Pace et al., 2013; Howard and
Adams, 2012).

5.2. Claims and Provider Data
For this analysis, I continue my use of detailed 2007-2013 claims and provider data from
a major insurer in the Southeast Pennsylvania region described in the previous chapter. I
include claims associated with women aged 40-64 who see office-based physicians. I follow Wharam et al. (2015) in defining codes associated with mammography receipt as well
as identifying which patients to exclude from the analysis due to complicating conditions
(such as a previous mastectomy) which might indicate that a mammogram is clinically
appropriate.
In constructing my dataset, I begin with all claims associated with women aged 40-64
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who see office-based physicians; I then exclude claims associated with women who have
a complicating condition as discussed above. I also limit the dataset to claims with a
diagnosis code that was associated with mammography at least once in the data. Limiting
the diagnosis codes included in the data allows me to exclude claims for injuries and other
encounters that are unlikely to be associated with a screening opportunity, with the aim of
constructing a relatively clean measure of a population of “mammography-eligible” patients.
In turn, this measure will serve as the denominator for my main measure of physician
mammography use, the proportion of eligible patient receiving a mammography (discussed
further below). As in the PSA analysis, I restrict the sample to providers who see five or
more “eligible” patients in a year, where eligibility is defined as females between the ages
of 40 and 64 without any mammography-related complicating conditions. The final claims
dataset includes 7.2 million claim lines from over 520,000 individuals covered by private
insurance (HMO and PPO plans) and Medicare Advantage. I aggregate the data to the
physician-month level (discussed further below); the final analytic dataset includes 465,267
physician-months, with an average of 9,500 unique physicians per month.
Nearly half of the providers in my sample are primary care providers (who identify their specialty as general practice or internal medicine). Figure 8 shows the distribution of providers
across practices of different sizes. Just over a quarter are solo practitioners and another 27
percent are in small groups of two to five physicians. Close to 15 percent are in groups of six
to 10 providers, and just over 20 percent are in medium-sized groups of 11 to 30 providers.
The remaining 11 percent are in big groups of over 30 providers.
As in the PSA analysis, the key outcome of interest in this study is the provision of mammograms. I measure this with a continuous measure of the percentage of “eligible” patients
who receive a mammogram, where “eligible” patients are defined as above. I count a patient as having received a mammogram based on the HCPCS or CPT codes associated
with the claim, as defined in Wharam et al. (2015). As mentioned above, I also follow
Wharam et al. (2015) in excluding claims with CPT or HCPCS codes that are associated
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Figure 8: Group size distribution of providers in the data

with mastectomies and other procedures that might indicate that a mammogram is clinically
appropriate. Omitting those with mammography-relevant complicating conditions allows
me to conclude that when a mammogram is provided in my data to a woman aged 40-49
it can be considered to be a potentially low-value service. If the USPSTF recommendation
results in disadoption of mammography, we would expect this measure to decrease following
the recommendation. The construction of the main explanatory variables, group size and
peer usage, is the same as in the PSA analysis.

5.3. Mammography Provision and Disadoption Trends
Figure 9 shows the percent of eligible patients (as defined above) who received a mammogram by quarter (physician-month level measure of the percent of a physician’s eligible
patients receiving a mammogram) for women aged 40-64 and the subset of women aged
40-49 who were the primary population affected by the 2009 USPSTF recommendation
change. The overall rate of mammography screening fell only very slightly over the period
of the graph, from about 10 percent in 2007-2008 to about 9 percent in 2012-2013 overall
56

and from about 11 percent to 9.6 percent between 2007-2008 and 2012-2013 in the population of women aged 40-49. There is no apparent significant drop in screening following the
USPSTF recommendation in November 2009. The finding that there is only a small decline
in mammography (particularly among women aged 40-49) is very different from the substantial decrease in PSA provision rates following the relevant USPSTF recommendation.
This may be due to the difference in strength of the two recommendations. The USPSTF
guideline for PSA screening recommended against screening in all men (grade “D”) while
the breast cancer screening guideline did not provide such a strong recommendation against
screening, instead recommending that women discuss the pros and cons of screening with
physicians rather than abide by routine biennial screenings (grade “C”). It is also possible
that the contrasting responses to the new guidelines in the case of mammography versus
PSA tests reflects stronger patient demand for breast cancer screening.
Rates of screening and the drop in screening are lower in my data than in other papers in the
literature, including the recent study by Wharam et al. (2015). There are several possible
explanations for the lower rates seen in this data, including differences in sample regionally
and racially. Wharam et al. (2015)’s data are largely from the South and Midwest while
the data for this study come from the five-county area around Philadelphia. The sample is
Wharam et al. (2015) is also predominantly white (72.5%) with relatively low proportions
of black (2.8%) and Hispanic (7.4%). In contrast, the region captured in my data includes
much larger black and Hispanic populations and a relatively smaller white population (for
example, Philadelphia county is 45.5% white, 44% black, and 13% Hispanic5 ), which translates into the population whose claims are included in my dataset. As Wharam et al. (2015)
note, significant declines in mammography in their data did not occure in black populations. This effect may be magnified in my data given the likely higher black population in
my data.
Figure 10 shows that mammography rates are uniformly higher among group practitioners
5

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42101.html
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Figure 9: Percent of eligible patients receiving a mammogram

relative to solo practitioners, though the rates converse towards the end, with a slight
decrease (increase) in group (solo) rates. Figures 11 and 12 show rates of mammography
by provider group size for women aged 40-64 and 40-49, respectively. In both age groups,
rates are lowest among providers in big groups of 30 or more providers (though note that
this is the smallest sample of providers in my data). Rates among those in groups of 2-10
and 11-30 are relatively similar, though these graphs demonstrate that the biggest decline
in mammography rates was among providers in medium-sized groups of 11-30 (reduction
of about 2 percent between 2007-2008 and 2012-2013 among women aged 40-64 and 2.6
percent among women aged 40-49).

5.4. Peer Effects in Physician Mammography Provision
In this section I present estimates of peer effects on individual physician provision of mammograms using the Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator. As in the previous chapter on PSA
screening, Tables 5 - 8 present estimates of (3.7) - (3.10) obtained using the AB estimator
where the dependent variable is a physician’s use of mammograms. In the case of mammography, it is relevant to consider all women aged 40-64 as well as the subset of women
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Figure 10: Percent of eligible patients receiving a mammogram, solo vs. group providers

Figure 11: Percent of eligible patients receiving a mammogram by provider group size,
women 40-64
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Figure 12: Percent of eligible patients receiving a mammogram by provider group size,
women 40-49

aged 40-49 for whom the USPSTF screening guideline changed substantively in 2009, from
recommending screening every one to two years (grade “B”) to not recommending routine
screening (grade “C”). Thus, I show estimates for the full population of women aged 40-64
as well as for this subgroup of interest, women aged 40-49. In the summary tables presented below, I show only contemporaneous effects from the AB estimation; full results can
be found in the appendix. Note that for this analysis (unlike the PSA analysis), I omit
the effects of local-shared peers. The PSA analysis suggested that levels of sharing among
peers in the same location were low and therefore the sample was not big enough to capture
any differential effects of physicians in the same office sharing patients beyond the direct
effects of practicing in the same location. For this analysis, due to sample sizes in each
group size category, I also collapse the group size categories from four categories used in the
PSA analysis (2-5 providers, 6-10, 11-30, and 30+) into three categories (2-10 providers,
11-30, and 30+). I remain focused on differential effects in medium-sized groups of 11-30
providers.
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Table 5 presents estimates of (3.7) in column (1) and (3.8) in column (2) for women aged
40-64. Estimates in column (1) indicate that local peer mammogram use (“Local PE”) is
significantly and positively associated with physician mammogram use while the effect of
shared peer use is not significant at the five percent level. The coefficient on “Local PE”
is remarkably similar in magnitude to that in the PSA analysis, and suggests that if an
individual physician’s local peers increase their use of mammography by some factor X,
the individual provider will increase his or her usage by about half of X. As in the PSA
analysis (reported in the full results table in the Appendix), lagged peer use estimates
are not significant, though estimates of the lagged dependent variables are significant and
positive, indicating that, as expected, that past use is associated with current use. Using
the AB test for autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals there is no evidence of serial
correlation at order 2 (p = 0.975) or order 3 (p = 0.580). Surprisingly, shared peer effects
appear to have a negative effect on individual physician mammogram provision (though the
effect is not significant at the five percent level). Shared peer effects capture mammography
usage by peers with whom the individual physician shares patients in a given quarter. The
majority of these relationships are between primary care providers and specialists (largely
obstetrics and gynecology specialists). Thus, the negative effect may reflect the fact that
PCPs refer patients to specialists assuming (or potentially agreeing between physicians)
that the specialist will provide the mammogram; therefore, if the specialist provides the
mammogram, the PCP is less likely to do so.
Column 2 shows estimates of (3.8), the differential effects of local and shared peers in groups
of different sizes. These estimates suggest that in groups of 11-30 providers there is an additional positive and significant effect of local peers compared to smaller groups. There is also
an additional positive effect of local peers in big groups of over 30 physicians, however this
effect is smaller in magnitude than the effect in medium-sized groups and significant only at
the 10 percent level. Consistent with the results in the setting of PSA testing, these results
suggest that local peer effects are strongest in these medium-sized groups. In contrast to
local peer effects, shared peer effects are not significant at the five percent level in groups
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of any size.

Table 5: Contemporaneous Peer Effects on Mammography Use, Overall and by Provider
Group Size, Women aged 40-64

Local P Et
Shared P Et

(1)
0.476***
[0.37, 0.58]
-0.029*
[-0.06, 0.00]

GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

135,787

(2)
0.428***
[0.32, 0.53]
-0.043*
[-0.09, 0.00]
0.235***
[0.07, 0.40]
0.179*
[-0.00, 0.36]
0.004
[-0.08, 0.08]
-0.003
[-0.16, 0.15]
135,787

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at
time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among
physicians with whom physician j shares patients at time t.

Table 6 shows the analogous results to those in Table 5 for the population of women aged
40-49. As can be seen, limiting the sample to this subpopulation leads to a drop in the
sample size of close to 60 percent. The effect of local peers remains significant and positive
and relatively close in magnitude to that estimated in the full population of women aged
40-64 [“Local PE” in column (1)]. In this subpopulation the interaction between group size
and local peer effects is no longer significant. This absence of a significant effect is likely
due to a lack of power given reduced sample sizes in each group size category rather than
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a true lack of effect.

Table 6: Contemporaneous Peer Effects on Mammography Use, Overall and by Provider
Group Size, Women aged 40-49

Local P Et
Shared P Et

(1)
0.382***
[0.25, 0.51]
-0.049
[-0.12, 0.02]

GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

57,258

(2)
0.283
[0.28, 0.28]
-0.063
[-0.06, -0.06]
0.238
[0.24, 0.24]
0.192
[0.19, 0.19]
-0.002
[-0.00, -0.00]
-0.053
[-0.05, -0.05]
57,258

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at
time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among
physicians with whom physician j shares patients at time t.
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Table 7 shows estimates of equations (3.9) and (3.10). Again, contemporaneous effects are
shown in the summary table and full estimates can be found in the Appendix. In column
(1), the main coefficients of interest are the interactions between the post-USPSTF recommendation period indicator and peer effects. The coefficients on these interactions show
that, overall, there were no differential effects of peers following the USPSTF recommendation relative to before the recommendation. I also do not find a differential effect of local
peers in medium-sized groups compared to other groups, after relative to before the new
recommendation [column (2)]. These results are not surprising given that there were only
small declines in mammography rates over this period and no apparent major decline following the new recommendation. I see a consistent lack of significant effects when equations
(3.9) and (3.10) are estimated in the subpopulation of women aged 40-49 (Table 8).
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Table 7: Contemporaneous Peer Effects on Mammography Use After the USPSTF Recommendation Change, Overall and by Provider Group Size, Women aged 40-64
(1)
0.054
[-0.02, 0.13]
0.004
[-0.06, 0.07]

Post*Local P Et
Post*Shared P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

135,787

(2)
0.021
[-0.09, 0.14]
0.034
[-0.05, 0.12]
-0.008
[-0.17, 0.16]
0.152
[-0.20, 0.51]
-0.121*
[-0.26, 0.02]
-0.150*
[-0.31, 0.01]
135,787

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at
time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among
physicians with whom physician j shares patients at time t.
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Table 8: Contemporaneous Peer Effects on Mammography Use After the USPSTF Recommendation Change, Overall and by Provider Group Size, Women aged 40-49
(1)
0.033
[-0.07, 0.13]
-0.055
[-0.18, 0.07]

Post*Local P Et
Post*Shared P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

57,258

(2)
-0.007
[-13.87, 13.86]
-0.077
[-121.85, 121.69]
0.064
[-33.69, 33.82]
0.097
[-96.42, 96.62]
-0.002
[-159.64, 159.63]
-0.015
[-18.00, 17.97]
57,258

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at
time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among
physicians with whom physician j shares patients at time t.
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Tables 9 and 10 show estimates from standard FD (first differences) and FE (fixed effects)
estimation of peer effects on physician mammography use. These tables show the main
effects of interest, estimated in the full population of women aged 40-64. The full results
for this sample as well as for the subpopulation of women aged 40-49 are in the Appendix.
The models estimated are analogous to the AB models shown in equations (3.7) - (3.10),
though of course without the lagged variables. The results are generally consistent. As with
Table 5, Table 9 shows estimates of peer effects overall and by group size. These estimates
provide supporting evidence that local peer effects have a positive and significant impact
on physician mammogram use. FD and FE estimates in columns (3) and (4) support the
finding that local peer effects are strongest in groups of 11-30 physicians. We also see a
strong negative effect of shared peers usage, perhaps for the same reasons discussed above.
Table 10, analogous to Table 7, shows estimates of the differential effects of local and shared
peers after relative to before the USPSTF recommendation, overall [columns (1) - (2)] and
by group size [columns (3) - (4)]. The first differences results show no differential effects
in the post-recommendation period, as found in the analogous AB estimation. In the fixed
effects regression, there is a puzzling negative coefficient on “Post*Local PE” which suggests
that in the post period, if a physician’s local peers ordered mammograms, the physician was
less likely to order mammograms. It is unclear what would cause this effect, but suggests
that accounting for the dynamics of physician service provision using the AB method is
important.
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Table 9: First Differences and Fixed Effect Estimates of Peer Effects on Mammography Use, Overall and By Provider Group Size

Local P Et
Shared P Et

(1)
First differences
0.018***
[0.01, 0.03]
-0.057***
[-0.07, -0.04]

(2)
Fixed effects
0.118***
[0.10, 0.13]
-0.101***
[-0.11, -0.09]

328,603

345,308

GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
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(3)
First differences
0.009
[-0.00, 0.02]
-0.063***
[-0.08, -0.05]
0.041***
[0.01, 0.07]
0.011
[-0.04, 0.06]
0.008
[-0.02, 0.04]
0.033
[-0.01, 0.07]
328,603

(4)
Fixed effects
0.105***
[0.09, 0.12]
-0.102***
[-0.12, -0.09]
0.063***
[0.03, 0.09]
0.028
[-0.01, 0.07]
-0.007
[-0.03, 0.02]
0.036**
[0.00, 0.07]
345,308

Notes:
Main effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Provider and month fixed effects included. SEs clustered at provider level.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among physicians with whom physician j shares
patients at time t.

Table 10: First Differences and Fixed Effect Estimates of Peer Effects on Mammography Use After the USPSTF Recommendation
Change, Overall and By Provider Group Size

Post*Local P Et
Post*Shared P Et

(1)
First differences
-0.005
[-0.03, 0.02]
-0.004
[-0.03, 0.02]

(2)
Fixed effects
-0.038***
[-0.06, -0.02]
0.003
[-0.02, 0.02]

328,603

345,308

Post*GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
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Post*GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

(3)
First differences
-0.002
[-0.03, 0.03]
-0.007
[-0.04, 0.03]
-0.007
[-0.07, 0.06]
-0.081
[-0.18, 0.02]
0.021
[-0.04, 0.08]
-0.043
[-0.12, 0.04]
328,603

(4)
Fixed effects
-0.043***
[-0.07, -0.02]
-0.012
[-0.04, 0.01]
0.013
[-0.02, 0.05]
-0.031
[-0.12, 0.06]
0.053**
[0.00, 0.10]
-0.004
[-0.05, 0.05]
345,308

Notes:
Main effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Provider and month fixed effects included. SEs clustered at provider level.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among physicians with whom physician j shares
patients at time t.

5.5. Peer Effects in Physician Mammography Provision across Patient Types: Evidence from HMO vs. PPO Enrollees
Providers may be more or less responsive to peer effects depending on the demands they
face from their patients. While it is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the effect of
patient demand, one way to gain insight into demand is to see whether physician peers have
varying influence in different groups of patients. One characteristic that may be associated
with differences in demand is enrollment in an HMO vs. PPO insurance plan. Patients
who enroll in HMO plans may have different underlying demand for healthcare than those
who enroll in PPO plans which offer much less restricted access to a wide set of providers.
Thus, we might expect provider peer effects to be less strong among PPO patients if these
patients have high demand for services which counters and perhaps offsets peer effects.
Figure 13 shows the percentage of eligible patients receiving mammograms for patients
enrolled in HMOs and in PPOs. Interestingly, mammography rates among PPO enrolles are
substantially lower than among HMO patients. The rate among HMO patients has declined
over this time period, from about 15 percent to 11.7 percent, while the rate among PPO
patients has remained generally steady. Tables 11 and 12 show results from AB estimation of
(3.7) - (3.10), estimated among the full population of women aged 40-64 (again, only select
results are shown here; the full results are included in the Appendix). Table 11, which shows
estimates of (3.7) in columns (1) and (2) (for HMO and PPO enrollees, respectively) and of
(3.8) in columns (3) and (4), suggests that local peers exert a significant and positive effect
on individual physician mammography provision for both HMO and PPO enrollees. There
are no differential effects by group size in either population.
Table 12, which shows estimates of (3.9) in columns (1) and (2) (for HMO and PPO enrollees,
respectively) and of (3.10) in columns (3) and (4) suggests that there was a differential positive effect of local peers following the USPSTF recommendation [Post*Local PE coefficient,
columns (2) and (4)] among PPO enrollees (though this effect is not significant at the five
percent level). This finding suggests that peer actions were even more influential following
70

Figure 13: Percent of eligible patients receiving a mammogram, HMO vs. PPO enrollees

the new recommendation for physicians’ decisions about how to treat PPO patients. It is
not possible to determine what is driving this effect. It could be that there is slightly differential demand for tests between HMO and PPO patients following the new guideline, or
it could suggest that, following the new guideline, physicians felt more flexibility in offering
mammograms to PPO patients relative to HMO patients (perhaps because PPO patients
could follow up with a gynecologist without a referral) so peer effects could have an impact
on PPO-patient-related decisions but not HMO-patient-related decisions.
Apart from the marginally significant finding regarding peer effects in treatment of PPO
patients following the new recommendation, however, these results generally suggest that
peer effects do not differ across HMO and PPO patients. If patient demand for mammography does differ across these two groups, it does not appear to outweigh the effects of local
peers. These findings are also consistent with evidence that physicians generally do not
alter non-medication treatment patterns among their patients based on insurance status
(Glied and Zivin, 2002).
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Table 11: Peer Effects on Mammography Use, Overall and By Provider Group Size, HMO vs. PPO Enrollees

Local P Et
Shared P Et

(1)
HMO Enrollees
0.430***
[0.30, 0.56]
-0.03
[-0.09, 0.03]

(2)
PPO Enrollees
0.540***
[0.42, 0.66]
-0.036*
[-0.08, 0.01]

64,518

93,618

GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
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(3)
HMO Enrollees
0.339***
[0.17, 0.51]
-0.027
[-0.12, 0.06]
0.212
[-0.14, 0.56]
0.2
[-0.06, 0.46]
0.012
[-0.28, 0.31]
0.08
[-0.17, 0.33]
64,518

(4)
PPO Enrollees
0.491***
[0.37, 0.61]
-0.006
[-0.06, 0.05]
0.095
[-0.21, 0.40]
0.081
[-0.10, 0.27]
-0.053
[-0.14, 0.03]
-0.048
[-0.16, 0.06]
93,618

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among physicians with whom physician j shares
patients at time t.

Table 12: Peer Effects on Mammography Use After the USPSTF Recommendation Change, Overall and By Provider Group Size,
HMO vs. PPO Enrollees

Post*Local P Et
Post*Shared P Et

(1)
HMO Enrollees
0.031
[-0.05, 0.12]
-0.046
[-0.16, 0.06]

(2)
PPO Enrollees
0.086*
[-0.01, 0.18]
-0.004
[-0.08, 0.07]

64,518

93,618

Post*GrpSz11-30*Local P Et
Post*GrpSz30+ *Local P Et
Post*GrpSz11-30*Shared P Et
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Post*GrpSz30+ *Shared P Et
N

(3)
HMO Enrollees
0.065
[-0.20, 0.33]
0.045
[-0.22, 0.32]
0.016
[-0.40, 0.43]
0.12
[-0.56, 0.80]
-0.099
[-1.00, 0.80]
-0.11
[-0.66, 0.44]
64,518

(4)
PPO Enrollees
0.113*
[-0.02, 0.24]
-0.031
[-0.15, 0.08]
-0.154*
[-0.34, 0.03]
0.161
[-0.27, 0.59]
-0.028
[-0.22, 0.17]
-0.023
[-0.27, 0.22]
93,618

Notes:
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation, twostep estimator.
Main contemporaneous effects shown, full estimates shown in Appendix.
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Month dummies included. Windmeijer-robust standard errors.
Dep var: proportion of mammogram-eligible patients receiving mammograms.
“Local PE”: local peer effect (µjgt ): mean mammogram rate in physician j’s group g at time t excluding physician j’s rate.
“Shared PE”: connected peer effect (αjt ): weighted mean of mammogram rates among physicians with whom physician j shares
patients at time t.

CHAPTER 6 : Discussion and Conclusions
Before offering concluding thoughts on what might be driving peer effects in the settings
considered in this dissertation, I discuss two “back of the envelope” approaches that use the
coefficients (partial effects) obtained in Chapters 4 and 5 to get a sense of the equilibrium
peer effect in PSA and mammography provision. First, I estimate the “social multiplier”
as described in Glaeser et al. (2003) which allows me to capture the full effect of peers
within different sized groups. Second, I use a rough dynamic model of social interactions to
examine trends in PSA and mammography provision with varying levels of peer effects.

6.1. Social Multipliers in Response to New Recommendations
The findings presented in the dissertation show that peer behavior influences the actions
of individuals within a group. Specifically, at the individual-level, my results suggest that
if usage of a low-value service by peers increases by a factor of X, an individual’s usage of
that service will rise by half of X. Glaeser et al. (2003) note that the presence of positive
spillovers where one person’s actions influence the actions of other members of his or her
group creates a “social multiplier” where the aggregate response to a policy will reflect both
individual responses and additional effects resulting from social interaction. For example, if
a new recommendation or other policy change impacts one individual in a practice then this
has a direct effect of her behavior but also has indirect effects through social influences when
her behavior influences others; thus changing her behavior may also change the behavior of
additional group members, resulting in a “social multiplier effect.”
Glaeser et al. (2003) present a simple representation of the social multiplier where person
i ’s action (Ai ) depends on average action within group G made up of N-1 other individuals
indexed by j (in a case presented in this dissertation, an individual physician’s PSA use
rate depends on average PSA use among the physician’s local peers):
P
Ai = γ(

j∈G(i),j6=i Aj

N −1
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) + i

(6.1)

Where i are person-specific shocks and γ captures the social interaction parameter. (The
term within the parentheses captures the group mean rate excluding i ’s rate.) I estimate
the social interaction parameter using Arellano-Bond estimation as described in Chapter 3.
As shown Glaeser et al. (2003), the social multiplier can be measured in this setting as:
N −1−γ
(1 − γ)(N − 1) + γ

(6.2)

Using the estimates of γ from my analysis of PSA and mammography provision, I find the
following estimates of the social multiplier:

Table 13: Social Multiplier Estimates (with 95% confidence intervals)
Mean N

γ

Social Multiplier

MAMMOGRAPHY:
All providers

14.79

Providers in groups of 2-10

4.71

Providers in groups of 11-30

18.37

Providers in groups of 30+

58.54

0.48
[0.37, 0.58]
0.43
[0.32, 0.53]
0.66
[0.50, 0.83]
0.61
[0.43, 0.79]

1.73
[1.48, 2.07]
1.29
[1.19, 1.40]
2.56
[1.83, 4.33]
2.45
[1.71, 4.37]

PSA TESTING:
All providers

29.88

Providers in groups of 2-5

3.13

Providers in groups of 6-10

7.58

Providers in groups of 11-30

18.37

Providers in groups of 30+

120.64

0.47
[0.23, 0.71]
0.35
[0.23, 0.47]
-0.05
[-0.38, 0.30]
0.61
[0.44, 0.79]
0.12
[-0.10, 0.34]

1.81
[1.28, 3.10]
1.03
[1.02, 1.04]
0.97
[0.80, 1.28]
2.28
[1.66, 3.71]
1.13
[0.91, 1.50]

Social multiplier estimates range from 0.97 (where there are slighly negative social impacts)
to 2.56 in mammography provision in groups of 11-30, where social impact is greatest. These
estimates suggest, for example, that in groups of 11-30, if a policy could exogenously induce
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one person to disadopt PSA testing, 2.28 people in total will disadopt due to the social
multiplier, the effect that the initial changer’s behavior has on others in the group. That is,
without a peer effect, we would expect only the person impacted directly by the policy to
change her behavior. With the peer effect, a total of 2.28 people will change their behavior.
Though rough, this calculation gives a sense of the full effect of immediate peers on overall
behavior within a group, suggesting that in this case, the policy would have approximately
double the effect in medium-sized groups than in solo practices due to peer effects. In the
future, the magnitudes of these effects could be compared to those of other policies aimed
at reducing the use of low-value services (e.g., changing reimbursement) to examine which
strategies might be most effective at reducing the use of these services in different types of
groups.

6.2. The Effect of Social Interactions over Time
Another approach to considering the full effect of peer behavior on disadoption is to examine
a dynamic social interaction model where the provision of a given service in each period
is a function of the local group provision rates. I discuss two methods to use this type of
model to assess the effects of peers in different settings on provision over time. First, I
conduct a simple simulation using the partial, individual-level effects obtained through the
regression analysis. To start, I assume a five-member physician group where each member
provides a given service to 25 percent of her patients (at time 0). In the following period,
three of the five group members reduce their usage by 50 percent so that they are now
providing the service to 12.5 percent of patients. This reduction changes the group mean,
which in turn influences each member of the group in the next period (the group mean is
calculated in each period for each member omitting her own rate), weighted by the social
impact parameter (γ), as shown below:

Ui,t = Ui,t−1 + γ ∗ M−i,t−1
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(6.3)

Where Ui,t (Ui,t−1 ) is use by individual i in period t (t-1 ) and M−i,t−1 is average use in
the group in period t-1 (omitting individual i ’s use from the construction of the group
mean). As before, the estimates of γ come from my regression analyses, which capture the
effect of the local group mean on individual behavior. I run the simulation for 20 periods,
until the change in individual-level provision from period to period is essentially zero, and
calculate mean provision rates across the five-member group. Figure 14 shows trends in
group-level provision for the different magnitudes of the social impact parameter (SIP in
graph) obtained in the regression analysis.

Figure 14: Simulated group-level mean provision rates, by magnitude of the social impact
parameter

Where the SIP is close to zero, usage drops in the first period due to the simulation but
then levels out at close to 18 percent. As the SIP increases, there is increasing disadoption
and provision plateaus at 3.7 percent where the SIP is the greatest (0.66). This simulation
offers a sense of how usage may be affected by varying levels of peer effects across different
group size settings.
Second, I employ the model outlined in Cutler and Glaeser (2007) where the rate at which

77

individuals choose a behavior is an increasing function of the proportion of the population
that is already engaging in that behavior to assess how peer effects impact equilibrium levels
of PSA and mammography rates over time. Cutler and Glaeser (2007) examine peer effects
in smoking behaviors. They outline the following dynamic social interaction model:1

S(t + 1) − S(t) = (a0 + a1 S(t))(1 − S(t)) − (b0 + b1 (1 − S(t))S(t))

(6.4)

Where S(t) is the share of the population who smokes at time t, a0 + a1 S(t) is the probability
that non-smokers switch to become smokers, and b0 + b1 S(t) is the probability that smokers
switch to become non-smokers. Parameters a1 and b1 capture the social impacts while a0
and b0 capture the transition probabilities that would exist in the absence of social influence.
Cutler and Glaeser (2007) assume that the social impacts of smoking and not-smoking are
the same (a1 = b1 ) and assume the values of S(0), a0 , and b0 . Then, using this method,
they are able to plot the equilibrium smoking rate over time.
I adapt this framework to consider the trends in PSA and mammography over time. First,
I follow Cutler and Glaeser (2007) in allowing only for providers to switch from non-users to
users (“initiation”). Rather than assuming values for S(0) and a0 , I estimate usage curves
based on transition probability a0 from my data and social impact parameter a1 from
regression analyses.2 I set S(0) based on the 2007 share of the provider population ordering
PSA tests or mammography. Figures 15 and 16 show time paths implied for providers in
different group sizes using PSA tests and mammography, respectively. For the most part,
I obtain standard S-shaped contagion curves. Consistent with the finding of strong peer
effects in groups of 11-30, providers in these groups adopt PSA screening and mammography
more quickly and converge faster to everyone providing these services. In Figure 15, the flat
S-curve and lack of convergence among providers in groups of 30+ and 6-10, respectively,
reflect small or slightly negative peer effects. In the case of mammography, S(0) and a0 are
1

The model assumes that the population is fixed and infinitely living.
Note that transition probabilities obtained from the data do not omit the effects of social influence but
serve as a useful approximation.
2

78

both larger in magnitude, resulting in faster convergence.
Figure 15: Simulated percent of providers ordering PSA tests with initiation only, by group
size

Figure 16: Simulated percent of providers ordering mammograms with initiation only, by
group size

Since I am (primarily) interested in users who are becoming non-users (“abandonment”),
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I use the full model [(6.4)] to estimate usage curves allowing for both types of switching.
I set a0 and b0 based on transition probabilities seen in the data and again set social
impact parameter a1 from regression analyses. I relax the assumption that a1 = b1 because
behavioral and other factors make it unlikely that the social impacts around disadopting
vs. adopting are equal. Instead, I assume that b1 = 1.5a1 since social impacts around
disadoption may be stronger given new recommendations and general attention on reducing
the use of low-value and overutilized services. Following Cutler and Glaeser (2007), I set
S(0) to be high to capture the potential long-run trend in PSA and mammography use
given the social impact parameters I obtain. Figures 17 and 18 show the results from
this estimation. In both settings, I again see a relatively more rapid decline in testing for
providers in groups of 11-30.
This approach requires strong assumptions but is useful in providing a perspective on longrun adoption and disadoption among providers in groups of different sizes. In addition, it
offers a chance to see roughly what trends in provision might look like with varying degrees
of social influence. For example, in the case of PSA provision, peer effects in groups of
30 or more providers were very small and in groups of 6-10 were slightly negative. Figure
17 shows that the trends in disadoption of PSA testing vary substantially across these
groups and demonstrate that trends would indeed look very different in the absence of
social influence. It is clear that, especially in the PSA setting, the stronger peer effects in
medium-sized groups result in faster adoption (when peer effects only promote adoption)
and disadoption, when peer effects for disadoption outweigh those for adoption. These
findings are true in the mammography setting as well, though the differences in peer effects
across group sizes are smaller and, in turn, differences in provision rates are smaller.
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Figure 17: Simulated percent of providers ordering PSA tests with initiation and abandonment, by group size

Figure 18: Simulated percent of providers ordering mammograms with initiation and abandonment, by group size
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6.3. Conclusions and Future Work
The type of organization in which a physician practices is likely to influence the type of care
they provide, in turn impacting health care costs and quality. Physician disadoption of lowor no-value services and procedures is necessary for reducing wasteful care and spending and
improving health care quality. Yet, while much work has explored questions of adoption of
new innovations, there is little evidence on what drives (and hinders) physician disadoption
of services once they have been shown to have little or no clinical value. Disadoption is likely
to be driven by a number of factors, including reimbursement, preferences, awareness and
agreement with the guidelines, and practice setting. Unlike in the case of adoption, there are
also behavioral factors such as inertia and loss aversion, which may hinder abandonment of
routine practices (patient demand may also be a challenge to disadoption). Indeed, existing
evidence suggests that patients continue to receive services even after there is evidence that
these services are on-net negative for patients (Duffy and Farley, 1992; Howard and Shen,
2011; Stafford et al., 2006).
This dissertation tests the effects of physician group size and peers on individual physician
provision of low-value services as well as disadoption of these services following the release
of new clinical guidelines recommending against routine provision. I estimate the effects of
two types of peers: local peers, who practice in the same office setting, and peers who share
patients but may not be co-located. I consider two specific cases: provision of prostate
cancer screening using the prostate-specific antigen or PSA test and disadoption following
the 2012 USPSTF recommendation against screening for all men; and provision of breast
cancer screening using mammography and disadoption following the 2009 USPSTF recommendation against routine screening for women between ages 40 and 49. These cases are
slightly different in terms of the strength of the new recommendations, with the PSA test
getting a “D” grade from the USPSTF (indicating the Task Force recommends against PSA
screening strongly) while mammography for women between 40 and 49 received a “C” grade
(recommending that women talk with their physicians about whether or not screening is
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needed rather than continuing routine screening every one to two years). Perhaps reflecting
this, as well as other factors, I find a considerable drop in PSA provision following the new
recommendation but only a slight decrease in mammography rates.
In this paper, I address three topics that have received little attention in the literature:
First, I study physician disadoption behaviors which are understudied relative to adoption
behaviors despite being critical to health policy goals; second, I study the effects of different
types of peers; and third, I test the relationship between peer effects and physician group
size. To summarize, there are three major findings from the analyses presented in this
dissertation. First, I find that physicians’ PSA and mammography rates are significantly and
positively affected by peers who practice in the same physical location while the behavior of
peers with whom they have a relationship (through shared patients) but are not co-located
does not have a significant impact. Second, I find that local peer effects are strongest
in medium-sized physician groups of 11-30 providers. Finally, I find that in the case of
PSA screening, local peers in medium-sized groups have a significant and positive effect on
physician provision of PSA testing following the release of the USPSTF recommendation in
2012 relative to before the release. This finding suggests that physicians in medium-sized
groups will be more likely to continue testing if their local peers continue testing, even
following the recommendation against screening.
Overall, these findings offer evidence consistent with the conclusion that local peers play
a role in physician decisions to stop providing a previously routine service and that these
influences are likely to be strongest in medium-sized groups. While my data do not allow me
to say conclusively what explains these results regarding local vs. non-local peers and group
size, the literature on peer effects offers some insights about what the underlying mechanisms
might be. Manski (2000) suggests that peer effects may be driven by social learning or social
norms. Social learning (“informational” influence) from peers reduces the the uncertainty
or risk associated with a given technology, procedure, or product. In turn, this additional
information may lead to behavior change. Social norms (“normative” influence) lead to
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behavior change when individuals seek to conform to peers’ expectations in order to gain
legitimacy. As described in Chapter 2, there is a rich literature in organizational theory
suggesting that local peers, in particular, set norms, define culture, and engage in face-toface discussions which impact the behavior of members of the group.
The relative role of normative vs. informational influence may vary depending on the
behavior (e.g., adoption vs. disadoption). For example, previous work has found that in
the case of physician use of a prescription drug, informational influence drives adoption
behavior because the physicians do not have any personal experience with the drug while
normative influence is important in repeat usage conditional on adoption (Iyengar et al.,
2015). In the decision to continue usage, the authors argue, the demand for learning is low
since physicians have learned from their own and others’ experience with the drug; instead,
physicians follow local practices and norms in maintenance decisions. Iyengar et al. (2015)
disentangle informational and normative influences by comparing the effects of immediate
peers (whom they argue exert normative pressure through local norms and culture) to the
effects of “opinion leaders” identified via survey, the source of informational influence.
Building on this work, one interpretation of my result that local peers impact PSA provision
post-recommendation is that these peers exert influence through normative means and that
this normative pressure plays a key role in disadoption decisions (while more distant peers
are likely to be a source of informational, rather than normative, influence). Information
is important when there is uncertainty, however at the time of the new recommendation,
physicians had considerable experience with PSA testing and the evidence underlying the
recommendation had in fact already been published. Thus, physicians were likely to have
both personal experience and existing knowledge on which to base their disadoption decisions and so there may not have been much demand for information or learning when
physicians made these decisions. Instead, the new recommendation can be thought of as
a shock to the legitimacy of PSA screening. Such a shock would be more likely to diffuse through normative influences, making local peers, among whom norms can be clearly
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established, relatively more influential than more distant peers.
Conformity allows physicians to gain legitimacy and not feel the costs of deviating from
the consensus behavior in terms of disagreement with peers and the potential for patient
dissatisfaction. Thus, if a physician’s local peers continue to offer low-value services, it
is more likely that the physician will also do so. Further, my results in the case of PSA
disadoption indicate that there may be an upper bound on increasing norms with increasing
group size. In very big groups (>30 physicians), I find that local peer effects are close to
zero. I also find near-zero peer effects in small groups of ten or fewer physicians, while effects
are strong in groups of 11-30 physicians. (In the mammography setting, I find positive peer
effects in all groups, but they are largest in groups of 11-30.)
One way of interpreting the results that local peer effects play a key role in disadoption of
PSA screening and that these peer effects are likely to be strongest in medium-sized provider
groups, is to consider the costs and benefits of conforming to peer norms in different types of
groups. In terms of the latent variable model presented in Chapter 3, these relationships are
captured by the costs (C(N )jt ) and benefits (P eerConf ormity(N )jt ) of conformity, which
are defined as a function of group size, N. If costs increase in group size because the effort of
coordinating behaviors grows with group size, then the costs of conforming will be relatively
low in small and medium-sized groups. In big groups, however, communication among
group members becomes relatively harder and the costs of coordination rise (Kimberly,
1976; Curoe et al., 2003; Wheelan, 2009). In this case, there may be a threshold group
size beyond which conformity to peers is too costly. While costs of conformity remain
manageable in medium-sized groups, benefits of conformity may also be greatest in these
groups. The benefits of conforming with peers are only felt if (i) norms are clear to all
group members and (ii) individual behavior is easily visible to other groups members so
that conformity can be recognized. In small groups, what constitutes a norm may be less
clear with only a few people in the group and thus peer pressure may be relatively less
strong; in big groups, monitoring of behavior is very costly making it less likely that social
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norms will be enforced and a physician’s deviation from the group norms may go unnoticed.
In this scenario, the optimal combination of benefits and costs of conformity is found in
medium-sized groups, where the costs of coordination are not too high but there are enough
people in the group to establish social norms and make conformity visible. Thus, local peer
effects would be strongest in these medium-sized groups, as I find in both the PSA and
mammography analyses. Illustrative relationships between the costs and benefits of conformity and group size are shown in Figure 19; as illustrated, the benefits of peer conformity
may exhibit a step-function over group size (a) or an inverted-U shape (b). The case of (a)
suggests that peer effects can only exist in groups of a certain (middle-range) size, while
the inverted-U shaped function (b) suggests that peer effects can exist in bigger or smaller
groups but that they peak in groups of medium size. My results, especially those from the
mammography analysis, suggest that case (b) is more likely. In the future, it will be useful
to test this argument by quantifying the costs and benefits of conforming to peers in groups
of different sizes, allowing for a more precise understanding of the interaction between peer
effects and group size.
Though there is no previous empirical evidence on the interaction of peer effects and group
size in the context of take-up of guidelines as far as I am aware, the conclusion that normative
influence is important in PSA provision following the USPSTF recommendation, and that
it varies with group size, is consistent with previous work on social influence. For example,
Mittman et al. (1992) suggest that social influence strategies depend on the setting: one-onone contact is recommended when individuals or small groups are targeted and mass media
is more effective when very large groups are targeted. In contrast, medium-sized groups are
“persuasion” settings, where local norms are likely to be important in implementation of
new guidelines (or any physician behavior change) and the most effective way to promote
individual physician change through social influence is to generate “norm transfer” within
“local units,” potentially exploiting the influence of local “opinion leaders.” The findings
presented support the idea that local groups and peers are likely to be important in medium-
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Figure 19: Relationships between the cost of learning and benefits of peer conformity and
group size
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sized groups in efforts to change behavior, including implementing new guidelines.
Policymakers are increasingly interested in reducing provision of low value health services
with the goals of cutting health care costs and improving quality of care. The release of
evidence-based guidelines aimed at lowering the rate of provision of these services, however,
has had limited effect on physician behavior in many cases. While the potential barriers to
adherence to guidelines have been described (Cabana et al., 1999), there is little empirical
evidence about how these guidelines diffuse across physician networks and what barriers
stand between awareness and implementation. In this dissertation, I show that peer effects
play a role in adherence to guidelines and that there is heterogeneity in influence across
different types of peers, in particular, local peers who practice in the same office and peers
who may not practice together but share patients. Further, I identify organizational settings
where these peer effects may be more or less relevant to physician behavior change. These
findings have potential implications for policy around improving adherence to evidencebased guidelines and lend insight into how physician behavior change might occur.
My results suggest that there is likely to be substantial nuance within peer interactions
which will be important to understand. Future research should use survey or other data to
study the mechanisms underlying the relationship between group size and local peer effects
(e.g., estimate the costs and benefits of conforming as group size increases) and consider
the interaction of local peer effects and other organizational and structure features such as
group scope and physician payment and incentives. In addition, this dissertation is limited
to the provision and disadoption of PSA testing and mammography, which are relatively
low-cost tests where the outcome in terms of costs and benefits is not immediate (i.e.,
substantial time may elapse before a patient with a positive test suffers from a complication
of cancer treatment) and also may not be easily visible, since anxiety due to a false positive
is a potentially major adverse consequence of a these screenings but may be hard for a
physician to internalize. It will be important in future work to test the effects of peers on
physician adoption and disadoption of different types of health services (e.g., adoption of a
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new technology vs. adoption of a new type of care delivery mechanism vs. disadoption of
a high cost procedure).
The findings in this dissertation have implications for the diffusion of information across
physician networks and organizations, an area that has received little empirical attention
in the past. These results suggest that a physician’s peers and the type of setting in which
he or she practices may play a role in his or her decisions about following guidelines and
disadopting low-value care. Recent evidence on physician organization suggests that the
distribution of physicians across groups of different sizes exhibits two “tails”: while a large
percentage of physicians continue to practice in solo settings, two-physician partnerships,
or small groups of fewer than five physicians, there is also a rapidly growing number of
very large physician practices (Burns et al., 2013). In addition, there is substantial policy
interest in the formation of large integrated systems. Given these trends, understanding
the dynamics of physicians’ relationships in groups of varying size and scope, and under
new organizational arrangements, will be critical to the diffusion of evidence-based medicine,
coordinated care, and other health delivery-related reforms. A better understanding of when
(e.g., in what settings) peer effects can enhance or hinder take-up of new guidelines could
play an important role in targeting awareness and behavior change initiatives to improve
adherence, as well as adding to our knowledge on diffusion of guidelines and other forms of
information and technology.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Additional PSA Results
A.1.1. Full Arellano-Bond Estimates

Table A1: Peer effects on PSA use, overall and by provider group size
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Table A1, continued: Peer effects on PSA use, overall and by provider group size
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Table A2: Peer effects on PSA use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by
provider group size
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Table A2, continued: Peer effects on PSA use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation,
overall and by provider group size
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Table A2, continued: Peer effects on PSA use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation,
overall and by provider group size

94

A.1.2. Full First Differences and Fixed Effects Results
Table A3: Peer effects on PSA use, overall and by provider group size
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Table A4: Peer effects on PSA use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by
provider group size

96

Table A4, continued: Peer effects on PSA use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation,
overall and by provider group size
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A.2. Additional Mammography Results
A.2.1. Full Arellano-Bond Estimates, all women aged 40-64
Table A5: Peer effects on Mammography use, overall and by provider group size
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Table A6: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall
and by provider group size
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Table A6, continued: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by provider group size
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A.2.2. Full Arellano-Bond Estimates, women aged 40-49
Table A7: Peer effects on Mammography use, overall and by provider group size
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Table A8: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall
and by provider group size
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Table A8, continued: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by provider group size
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A.2.3. Full First Differences and Fixed Effects Results, all women aged 40-64
Table A9: Peer effects on PSA use, overall and by provider group size
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Table A10: Peer effects on PSA use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by
provider group size
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A.2.4. Full First Differences and Fixed Effects Results, women aged 40-49
Table A11: Peer effects on PSA use, overall and by provider group size
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Table A12: Peer effects on PSA use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by
provider group size
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A.2.5. Full Arellano-Bond Results, HMO enrolles (women aged 40-64)
Table A13: Peer effects on Mammography use, overall and by provider group size, HMO
Enrollees
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Table A14: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation,
overall and by provider group size, HMO Enrollees
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Table A14, continued: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by provider group size, HMO Enrollees
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A.2.6. Full Arellano-Bond Results, PPO enrolles (women aged 40-64)
Table A15: Peer effects on Mammography use, overall and by provider group size, PPO
Enrollees
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Table A16: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation,
overall and by provider group size, PPO Enrollees
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Table A16, continued: Peer effects on Mammography use pre vs. post USPSTF recommendation, overall and by provider group size, PPO Enrollees
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